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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BANKRUPTCY- TAX LIENS- 1966 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 17a(1)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT CONSTRUED TO PREVENT ATTACHMENT OF
LIEN TO ASSETS ACQUIRED AFTER THE FILING OF A PETITION IN
BANKRUPTCY.
In re Carlson (C.D. Cal. 1968)
In re Braund (C.D. Cal. 1968)
The bankrupt, Braund,' was indebted to the federal government for
unpaid income taxes for the taxable years 1953 through 1960 and a de-
ficiency was assessed and tax liens filed in various public places.2 Braund
filed a petition in bankruptcy in October 1966 and was granted a discharge
in December of that year. In May 1967 the Internal Revenue Service
issued notices of levy against certain life insurance companies demanding
that property acquired by the bankrupt after the discharge, namely, the
increase in the loan values of the policies held by the bankrupt, be paid
on account of the tax liabilities as property subject to the liens. 3 The
bankrupt sought to have the levy set aside and received an order from
the federal court referee declaring that those tax liens of the United
States which arose for taxes which became legally due and owing 3 years
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, do not extend to property
acquired or income earned subsequent to that filing.
In the second case, the bankrupt, Carlson, was indebted under a
sales and use tax to the Board of Equalization of the State of California
for a tax liability which arose more than 3 years before the filing of
his petition in bankruptcy. This liability, similar to Braund's, was secured
by liens recorded in various public places.4 Since the assets owned by
the bankrupt at the time of the filing were insufficient to pay the tax
liability in full, the Board sought to levy upon his salary which had been
earned after the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the bankrupt sought
and received an order from the referee enjoining the Board from levy-
ing on this after-acquired property.
In separate review proceedings before different judges, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California affirmed the
1. There were actually two bankrupts and two cases. While Walter and Virginia
Braund filed joint tax returns, they filed separate bankruptcy petitions. Both cases
are hereinafter treated as one.
2. The federal tax lien arises when an assessment is made and perfects against
most interests when notice of the lien is filed. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6321-23.
3. It was undisputed that the tax lien had attached to certain property owned by
the bankrupt as of the date of filing. The parties stipulated, however, that the proceeds
realized from the sale of the property would be insufficient to satisfy the total debt.
In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 23,707,
9th Cir., Dec. 26, 1968.
4. Under § 67c(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B)
(Supp. III, 1968), the validity of a statutory lien is determined by local lien law. See
4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 67.24, at 312 (14th ed. 1967).
(323)
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respective referee's orders, holding that government tax liens, arising from
taxes which became legally due and owing more than 3 years prior to
the date of his filing in bankruptcy, do not extend or attach to any prop-
erty acquired or earned by the bankrupt subsequent to his filing. In re
Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 23,580,
9th Cir., Nov. 19, 1968; In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604 (C.D. Cal. 1968),
appeal docketed, No. 23,707, 9th Cir., Dec. 26, 1968.
Prior to the 1966 amendment to section 17a(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act,5 tax debts were not dischargeable in bankruptcy and tax liens at-
tached not only to property owned by the taxpayer at the time of their
perfection 6 but also to property which the taxpayer later acquired.7 In
1966, as part of a general reform of the Bankruptcy Act, section 17a(1)
was amended to read:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of
his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such
as (1) are taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt
to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof
within three years preceding bankruptcy . . . And provided further,
That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release or affect any tax
lien .... 8
Though amended section 17a(1) differs significantly from the old section,
both courts were principally concerned with only one revision, namely,
the proviso that the discharge shall not "release or affect" any tax lien.9
The precise issue before both courts was whether the effect of the second
proviso would be to allow the government to attach property acquired
by the bankrupt after his filing in bankruptcy in order to satisfy any
unpaid tax liabilities. 10 The government contended that the liens con-
tinued to be effective after the discharge in bankruptcy and therefore
could attach to after-acquired property." The bankrupts, on the other
5. Section 17a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act previously read:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are due as a tax
levied by the United States, or any State, county, district, or municipality ....
Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621, § 2, 74 Stat. 409.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (Supp. III, 1968).
9. Since all parties stipulated that the tax deficiencies in question became "legally
due and owing" 3 years prior to the filing in bankruptcy, this issue was not before the
court. However, since the phrase "legally due and owing" is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Act, it may well be a disputed question in subsequent litigation. One
commentator suggests any one of three dates could be utilized to fix the liability:
(1) the end of the calendar or fiscal year, (2) the date the return is filed, or (3) the
date an assessment is made. 1 W. COLLIER, supra note 4, ff 17.14, at 1615. It was
recently held that the date of assessment was the time when taxes are legally due
and owing. In re Nigro Freight Lines, Inc., 42 Rgiv. J. 28 (D. Conn. 1968).
10. In re Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed,
No. 23,580, 9th Cir., Nov. 19, 1968; In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604, 607 (C.D. Cal.
1968), appeal docketed, No. 23,707, 9th Cir., Dec. 26, 1968.
11. It was argued that any other construction would overrule Glass City Bank
v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945), by "affecting" the defined nature of a tax lien.
See Brief for Appellant at 10, In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal
docketed, No. 23,707, 9th Cir., Dec. 26, 1968.
[VOL. 14
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hand, took the position that the liens applied only to property belonging
to them as of the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and
therefore were incapable of affecting after-acquired property.
Though both Judge Hill and Judge Hauk treated their respective
cases as ones of first impression, their approaches to the problem did not
differ materially. 12 Initially, both courts attempted to resolve the issue
by looking to the language of the statute itself. The Braund court candidly
concluded that the language of section 17a(1) was imprecise, unclear,
and seemingly contradictory." It reasoned that upon the granting of a
discharge the amendment appears to relieve the taxpayer of his stale tax
liabilities; however, if that discharge does not "affect" the tax lien secured
thereon, which would appear to be the meaning of the second proviso,
the taxpayer is not relieved of his stale claims since under prior law
the lien has the power to attach to after-acquired property.' 4 This ap-
parent internal inconsistency motivated the Braund court, following the
general rule of statutory interpretation, 15 to turn to the amendment's
legislative history to ascertain its meaning. Although the Carlson court
found the meaning of the amendment to be clear and in support of the
bankrupt's position,'6 it likewise considered it wise, though not necessary,
to examine the legislative history of the enactment.' 7
An examination of the legislative history of the amendment provided
support for both sides of the controversy. The governments' position
that the tax liens were effective against after-acquired property was
buttressed by statements made on the Senate floor by Senator Ervin who
initiated consideration of the bill amending section 17a(1)."8 Senator
Ervin stated:
[T]his bill seeks . . . to strike a balance between the demands for
rehabilitation of the bankrupt and the just claims of the Federal
Government. It would provide that tax claims originating within
3 years prior to the bankruptcy remain just as valid as they are
under existing law. It provides where the Internal Revenue Service
has filed a lien, and thus given the general public which deals with
the prospective bankrupt knowledge of the Federal Government's
claim, that those taxes - regardless of how long they antedated the
bankruptcy - are still valid. Other tax claims which originated
prior to 3 years before bankruptcy and which have not been reduced
to a lien, are discharged .... 19
12. Judge Hill in Braund was aware of Judge Hauk's oral decision in Carlson
and also knew that the same result had been reached in United States v. Sanabria,
No. 67-C-505 (N.D. Ill., May 23, 1968), an unreported case. 289 F. Supp. at 606 n.2.
13. 289 F. Supp. at 606.
14. See p. 324 & note 7 supra.
15. De Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. 538, 558(1934) ; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Riv. 395, 400 (1950)Mac Callum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 758-760 (1966).16. 292 F. Supp. at 780-81.
17. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1948) (there is no need to refer to legislative
history where the statutory language is clear).
18. H.R. Rep. No. 3438, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
19. 112 CONG. REc. 13,810 (1966).
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Moreover, Senator Ervin later had a prepared statement printed in the
Record: "One point which I would like to make clear is that this bill
does not affect taxes, if the tax has been reduced to a tax lien and made
part of the public record."'20 It thus seems clear that Senator Ervin
was proposing only a limited change in the law - that tax claims which
become legally due and owing 3 years before the filing in bankruptcy
would be discharged only where the government had not filed a lien
which would afford the general public notice of the claim. The position
that the dischargeability of tax claims should depend on whether notice
of the claim is given to the general public would, however, appear to
lack cogency. The fact that third parties have knowledge of the debt
would seem irrelevant where the only parties concerned with the issue
of dischargeability are the taxpayer and the government.
Both the Braund and Carlson courts, on the other hand, found lan-
guage which supported the bankrupts' contention that the second proviso
was inserted only to make it clear that where a lien had attached to certain
property, the discharge in bankruptcy would not affect the right of the
government to proceed against that property already subject to the lien.2 1
Therefore, while the tax lien would be effective against that property
owned as of the date of filing, it could not affect after-acquired property.
This construction is supported by the House and the Senate Judiciary
Committee Reports on the new bill wherein it is stated:
While, under this bill, unsecured tax claims due and owing more
than 3 years prior to bankruptcy would be dischargeable, there is
no intention to place any time limit on otherwise valid tax liens. As
with other secured claims like mortgages and conditional sales con-
tracts, the purpose of the lien is to give the creditor a property in-
terest which is indefeasible in bankruptcy. Thus, to the extent that
the tax- authorities may satisfy their claims out of the security they
hold, They zwill be unaffected by the discharge regardless of the fact
that the underlying debt may include taxes for years prior to the
3-year period preceding bankruptcy. The second proviso to section
17a(1) proposed by section 2 of this bill emphasizes this legislative
intent. 22
Confronted with legislative history which supported two inconsistent
positions, both courts, in making their final determination of the proper
construction of amended section 17a(1), adopted the bankrupts' conten-
tions for two reasons: (1) remarks made in the course of Senate debate
are not entitled to carry the same weight as carefully considered commit-
20. 112 CONG. Rtc. 13,819 (1966) (emphasis added).
21. In re Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778, 781 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed, No.
23,580, 9th Cir., Nov. 19, 1968; In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1968),
appeal docketed, No. 23,707, 9th Cir., Dec. 26, 1968.
22. H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); S. R9P. No. 1158, 89th
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tee reports 23 and, more importantly, (2) the effectuation of the general
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to rehabilitate the bankrupt.24
In examining the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act the committee re-
ports focused on the flaws in the existing law with an eye toward remedy-
ing the situation with the new amendment. It was not disputed that the
nondischargeability of tax claims prevented the bankrupt from making a
fresh start unburdened by what very well might be the largest claim
against his estate. Moreover, such nondischargeability discriminated
against the private individual or unincorporated small businessman. While
a corporate bankrupt theoretically was not discharged, it normally dis-
solved upon bankruptcy, the practical effect of which was to relieve the
corporation of the burden of unsatisfied tax claims.2 5 However, since
the unincorporated bankrupt did not have the ability to dissolve after
bankruptcy, the dischargeability of his tax debts was dependent upon
the "purely fortuitous circumstance" of whether the taxing authority had
yet noticed a lien. 26 Therefore, by construing the statute to prevent the
governments' tax lien from affecting after-acquired property both the
Braund and Carlson courts sought to interpret the new amendment in
such a way as to cure the evils recognized by the committees and, at
the same time, further the general purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. To
hold that the lien had continued vitality to attach to after-acquired prop-
erty while the underlying debt was discharged would have imposed an
"unwarranted limitation" upon the remedy created by Congress. 27
The complex legislative history of the amendment provides a possible
explanation why the amendment appears to grant dischargeability of tax
claims with one hand and revoke that same grant by preserving lien
status with the other hand.28 The amendment had been passed by the
House four times29 and had been the focus of seven favorable House
and Senate reports before receiving the status of law.30  In examining
23. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957) (language used
by a Senator during oral argument is not always accurate or exact and therefore may
not reflect the true statutory intent) ; Gan Seow Tung v. Carusi, 83 F. Supp. 480, 481(S.D. Cal. 1947) (while such statements may be considered, they are held to be a
highly doubtful aid to statutory construction) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC,
101 F.2d 620, 623 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939).
Noticeably absent from either case was a judgment as to the weight to be
accorded the Senator's prepared statement.
24. S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nxws
2442, 2450 (1966).
25. S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Ngws
2468, 2469 (1966).
26. In re Braund, 289 F. Supp. 604, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed,
No. 23,707, 9th Cir., Dec. 26, 1968.
27. In re Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778, 784 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed,
No. 23,580, 9th Cir., Nov. 19, 1968.
28. See 1 W. COLLIER, supra note 4, 17.14, at 1617.
29. August 25, 1959, August 7, 1961, July 3, 1963, and August 2, 1965. After
approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee it was referred to the Senate Finance
Committee where it remained until reported out to the 89th Congress.
30. S. REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ; S. REP. No. 998, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966) ; S. REP. No. 996, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ; S. REP. No. 114,
WINTER 1969]
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this complex course of events, one commentator has argued that this re-
sulted in placing the second proviso in an improper section - that it
rightfully belongs in section 64a where section 17a(1) is incorporated
by necessary implication.8 1 To interpret the second proviso to read, as
the Braund and Carlson courts in effect do, that a discharge does not
affect a lien on property owned as of the date of filing is basically "non-
sensical" and uninforming82 because a discharge in bankruptcy is always
prospective in nature; it serves to keep after-acquired assets unencum-
bered so the bankrupt may make a fresh start.33 However, except where
a state statute exempts property, a discharge in bankruptcy never relieves
the bankrupt's existing property from liability.3 4 If, however, the second
proviso is read in conjunction with section 64a(4), the words take on
meaning. Prior to the 1966 amendments to section 64a(4), unsecured
tax claims were given unlimited priority over general unsecured creditors. 3 5
One of the amendments to that section limited this priority treatment to
those tax claims "which are not released by discharge. '36 Since section
17a(1), also amended in 1966, specifically enumerates those tax claims
which are not released by discharge,37 it is necessary to refer to section
17a(1) to determine what particular tax claims are entitled to priority
under section 64a(4). If the claim is discharged pursuant to section
17a(1) - i.e., is outside the 3-year period and not included within one
of the five exceptions - it is not entitled to priority under section 64a(4).
Therefore, the combined effect of the 1966 amendments to section 17a(1)
and section 64a(4) is to deny priority to certain tax claims. However, to
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
H.R. REP. No. 537, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; H.R. REP. No. 735, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959). See also S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Finance
Comm.). See Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. Riv. 149,
171-72 (1967). For a history, resum6 of changes, and comparative legislation con-
cerning the amendment, see 1 W. COLLIER, supra note 4, f 17.01, at 1575-80.
31. Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966,
42 WASH. L. Rtv. 681, 712 (1967).
32. Id.
33. One exception to the prospective nature of a discharge is property which vests
in the bankrupt within 6 months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise, or inheritance.
Bankruptcy Act § 70, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (Supp. III, 1968).
34. W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 17.11, at 219.1 (2d ed. 1968).
35. Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) provided:(a) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to
[general] creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order
of payment, shall be .. . (4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the
United States or any State or any subdivision thereof ....
Act of Sept. 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-681, § 8, 76 Stat. 571.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. III, 1968).
37. [A] discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes (a)
which were not assessed in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return
required by law, (b) which were assessed within one year preceding bankruptcy
in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law, (c)
which were not reported on a return made by the bankrupt and which were not
assessed prior to bankruptcy by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the
exhaustion of administrative or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt, (d)
with respect to which the bankrupt made a false or fraudulent return, or willfully
attempted in any manner to evade or defeat, or (e) which the bankrupt has col-
lected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or
any State or political subdivision thereof, but has not paid over; but a discharge
shall not be a bar to any remedies available under applicable law to the United
[VOL. 14
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the extent that the taxing authority has reduced its tax claims to a tax
lien, it becomes a secured creditor and rightfully should share in any
bankruptcy distribution prior to those unsecured creditors given priority
under section 64a(4). Congress, by means of the second proviso, intended
to specifically negate any possibility that those tax claims reduced to liens
would lose their priority status as had tax claims which had been dis-
charged. In this way the second proviso serves a useful purpose. By
restating the existing law, Congress made it clear that tax liens would
not be "affected." 38
The most significant ramification of the courts' interpretation of
section 17a(1) would appear to be a more complete reformation of the
bankrupt. As a practical matter, however, this new opportunity for refor-
ination may be severely restricted. It has been posited that such a court
interpretation will cause the taxing authority, the IRS in most cases, to be
less sympathetic in arranging deferred payment plans for a tax liability
older than 3 years, or arranging any plan to extend payment of recent
claims over 3 years. 9 If, due to the courts' decision, that policy is in fact
pursued, the taxpayer may not receive the benefits which the courts believe
Congress meant to confer.
In conclusion, it is evident that the reasoning employed by both the
Braund and Carlson courts was properly guided by a desire to effectuate
the general purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. Viewed in this light, the
interpretation afforded the second proviso to section 17a(1) appears valid.
The decision does little, however, to relieve the literal inconsistency which
appears within the section. It is suggested that Congress should cure the
problem, as proposed by one commentator,40 by placing the second proviso
in section 64a where it will serve a useful purpose.
Gilbert Newman
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - NEW JERSEY
HOMICIDE STATUTE PRECLUDING DEATH PENALTY ON PLEA OF
NON VULT DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH
OR SIXTH AMENDMENT.
State v. Forcella (N.J. 1968)
Petitioners Forcella and Funicello were indicted for murder, pleaded
not guilty, and were convicted by a jury without recommendation for life
States or to any State or any subdivision thereof, against the exemption of the
bankrupt allowed by law and duly set apart to him under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
38. Marsh, supra note 31 at 712
39. See H.R. REP. No. 67, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1965) (letter from Stanley
S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966), 2 U.S. CoDt CONe. & AD. News 2452-53 (1966) (letter from Henry
H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury). See also Marsh, supra note 31, at 713.
40. Marsh, supra note 31.
WINTER 1969]
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imprisonment. Their convictions and sentences were affirmed by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey on direct appeal.' Petitioners Ornes and
Perez were also indicted for murder and pleaded not guilty. Each case
was governed by the New Jersey homicide statute which provides for a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment where a defendant pleads non
vult to a murder indictment,2 but allows capital punishment to be imposed
where the indictment is defended before a jury." The matters were con-
solidated for review when petitioners Forcella and Funicello, seeking post-
conviction relief, and Ornes and Perez, by way of a pre-trial motion,
challenged the death penalty provision of the New Jersey statute, arguing
that the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Jackson4
had held that this procedure unconstitutionally burdens the assertion of
the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
affirmed the death sentences in the Forcella and Funicello matters and
denied Ornes' and Perez' motion, holding that the New Jersey capital
punishment procedure was clearly distinguishable from that involved in
Jackson in that (1) the New Jersey statute does not bear upon the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury because all jury waivers are disallowed
in murder trials; (2) waiver of the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination is in no way improperly induced by provision for a non
vult plea since the acceptance of such plea depends entirely on the discre-
tion of the trial judge; and (3) the statute does not "needlessly" impose
a penalty on the exercise of the right against self-incrimination. State v.
Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), petition for cert. filed, No.
947 Misc., U.S., Oct. 1, 1968.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has developed the
rule that certain procedural alternatives cannot be so structured that the
effect of choosing between them is to penalize the assertion of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights or to coerce their waiver.5 This approach has
1. State v. Funicello, 49 N.J. 553, 231 A.2d 579 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
911 (1968) ; State v. Forcella, 35 N.J. 168, 171 A.2d 649 (1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 866 (1962).
2. N.J. Rgv. S1rAT. § 2A:113-3 (1953) provides:
In no case shall the plea of guilty be received upon any indictment for murder,
and if, upon arraignment, such plea is offered, it shall be disregarded, and the
plea of not guilty entered, and a jury, duly impaneled, shall try the case.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the accused from pleading non vult
or nolo contendere to the indictment; the sentence to be imposed, if such plea be
accepted, shall be either imprisonment for life or the same as that imposed upon
a conviction of murder in the second degree. (emphasis added)
The plea of non vult or nolo contendere has the equivalent effect of a plea of guilty
in the case in which it is entered. In re 17 Club, 26 N.J. Super. 43, 44, 97 A.2d 171,
172 (1953).
3. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 2A:113-4 (1953) provides in pertinent part:
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, his aiders, abettors,
counselors and procurers, shall suffer death unless the jury shall . . . recommend
life imprisonment, in which case this and no greater punishment shall be imposed.
Every person convicted of murder in the second degree shall suffer imprison-
ment for not more than 30 years.
See State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000(1964).
4. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
5. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
[VOL. 14
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been judicially applied where both fifth and sixth amendment rights have
been in issue. For example, in Griffin v. California6 it was held that the
fifth amendment prohibited comment by the prosecution on an accused's
failure to testify, as well as instructions by the court that silence is some
evidence of guilt. Such comment was considered "a penalty imposed . . .
for exercising a constitutional privilege . . . [which] cuts down on the
privilege by making it costly."'7 Similarly, the choice presented to police-
men8 and to a lawyer 9 of waiving the right against self-incrimination or
forfeiting their livelihoods has been held to be constitutionally defective.
In Spillers v. State,10 the Nevada supreme court held that the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury was burdened by the Nevada rape statute"
which provided that only a jury could impose the death penalty for a
conviction of rape. The Nevada court reasoned that such a procedure
compelled a defendant to pay a "terrible price" for exercising his right
to trial by jury - "the possibility of death.' 12
Against this background the United States Supreme Court faced the
problem presented in United States v. Jackson.18 The defendant in Jackson,
indicted for violation of the Federal Kidnaping Act,'14 faced the following
three alternatives:
(1) Plead guilty15 - the effect being an automatic waiver of the right
to a jury trial and the possibility of a sentence for a term of years or,
at most, life;
(2) Plead not guilty and waive his right to a jury trial'6 - and
defend the case before a judge which could result in acquittal, or if found
guilty, imprisonment for a term of years or for life;
6. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7. Id. at 614.
8. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
9. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
10 ...... Nev ___ 436 P.2d 18 (1968).
11. Law of March 24, 1909, ch. CCXXIX, § 44, [1909] Stat. of Nev. 325.
12. ____ Nev. at . ,436 P.2d at 22. See also Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp.
994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where it was held that the provisions of the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-34 (1964), which required a juvenile offender to
waive a jury trial before he could obtain the benefits of a juvenile proceeding, uncon-
stitutionally penalized the exercise of the right to trial by jury; United States v.
Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Conn. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 570
(1968) ; cf. Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 381
F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). But see McDowell v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426
(E.D. Tenn. 1967); Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581 (D.C.N.J. 1967)
Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
13. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). For discussions of Jackson, see 35 BROOKLYN L. REv.
122 (1968) ; 82 HARV. L. Rxv. 156 (1968) ; 22 Sw. L.J. 544 (1968).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). Subsection (a) provides:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person who has
been unlawfully . . . kidnaped . . . and held for ransom . . . or otherwise . . .
shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprison-
ment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
15. This right, however, is not absolute. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 provides that the
court "may refuse to accept a plea of guilty .... For an interpretation of this rule,
see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
16. FED. R. CRITA. P. 23(a) provides: "Cases required to be tried by jury shall
be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the
court and the consent of the government."
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(3) Plead not guilty and assert his right to a jury trial - in which
event he could be acquitted by the jury, or if found guilty, face either im-
prisonment for a term of years or life, or death if the jury so recommended.' 7
Since a defendant could avoid imposition of the death penalty by
choosing either of the first two alternatives, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, framed the issue as whether the Constitution permitted
the establishment of a death penalty "applicable only to those defendants
who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury."' 8 The "in-
evitable effect" of such a procedure, the Court held, was "to discourage
assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial."' 9
Although the Court admitted that the procedure in the Kidnaping Act
operated to ameliorate the severity of punishment 20 and that such a con-
gressional objective was valid, this could not be accomplished by means
that "needlessly" chilled the exercise of fundamental rights.21 Since there
are other alternatives to obviate the burden on constitutional rights, such
as the practice in the State of Washington to allow the issue of punish-
ment to be decided by the jury in every capital case regardless of how
guilt had been determined, 22 the Court reasoned that the effect of the federal
procedure was "unnecessary and therefore excessive," and constituted a
penalty for the assertion of constitutional rights.2 ' The "primary evil" of
the Act, the Court concluded, was not that it necessarily "coerce[d]" guilty
pleas and jury waivers, but simply that it "needlessly encourage [d]" them.2 4
Once it determined that the federal procedure was unconstitutional,
the Court then faced the problem of what course of action to take to
eliminate the constitutional defect. The district court quashed defendant's
conviction in deciding that the constitutional defect rendered the entire
Act invalid.2 5 The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that since
the capital punishment provision of the Act had been added by Congress
as an afterthought, 26 it was severable without frustrating the primary
congressional purpose of punishing interstate kidnapers. The defendant's
conviction was therefore upheld, but his sentence was reduced to life
imprisonment.
In the instant case the New Jersey supreme court considered the
question of whether the holding of Jackson prohibited the death penalty
17. See note 14 supra.
18. 390 U.S. at 581.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 913-14 (2d Cir. 1965).
21. 390 U.S. at 582.
22. WASH. Rxv. CODe §§ 9.48.030, 10.49.010 (1961).
23. 390 U.S. at 582-83.
24. Id. at 583.
25. United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Conn. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). For comment on the lower court opinion, see 22
RUTGERS L. Rtv. 167 (1967).
26. The original Federal Kidnaping Act, 47 Stat. 271 (1932), contained no
capital punishment provision. The Act was amended in 1934, 48 Stat. 301, to provide
for imposition of the death penalty and to employ substantially the same language as
presently appears in 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
[VOL. 14
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procedure of the New Jersey homicide statute. Under the statute, a
murder defendant faced two alternatives:
(1) Plead not guilty - which would automatically result in a jury
trial, at which he could be acquitted, be found guilty of a lesser offense,
or be convicted of first degree murder and face the death penalty unless
the jury recommended leniency ;27
(2) Plead non vult - and if the plea were accepted by the court,
expose himself to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.2 8
Although it appeared that the court confronted a Jackson-type pro-
cedure, Chief Justice Weintraub, writing for the majority, characterized
Jackson as a situation where a defendant subjected himself to the risk
of death if tried by a jury, but no more than life imprisonment if tried
by a judge. Hence a federal defendant who pleaded not guilty could be
subject to the death penalty only if he insisted on a jury trial. The New
Jersey procedure, on the other hand, foreclosed the possibility of a homi-
cide defendant being tried before a judge because a court rule required
all not guilty pleas to be tried before a jury.29 Therefore, Chief Justice
Weintraub concluded that in New Jersey "there is no pressure on one
who stands trial to forego his right to a jury.' '30
Having distinguished the sixth amendment challenge, the court then
separately decided whether New Jersey's provision for a non vult plea
unconstitutionally induced the waiver of the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. Two lines of reasoning were utilized in holding that
it did not. The first was that the state procedure was distinguishable from
the federal procedure at issue in Jackson. The court decided that the fifth
amendment distinction rested on the federal defendant's "'right', in a
realistic sense, to plead guilty,"' while a New Jersey defendant had no
such right under the statute.3 2 Nor did the state defendant have a right
27. See note 3 supra.
28. See note 2 supra.
29. N.J. Rnv. RULE 3:7-1 (a) provides, inter alia, that "in murder cases a jury
may not be waived."
30. 52 N.J. at 270, 245 A.2d at 184 (emphasis added). The court attempted to
clarify this distinction by setting out the following hypothetical:
[I]f a statute provided that the death penalty may be imposed when guilt is found
either by judge or by jury, but that life imprisonment is the maximum penalty
upon a plea of guilty, it could not be said the right to jury trial is burdened. Such
a statute would no more burden that right than it would burden any other Sixth
Amendment right relating to the mode or manner of a trial of a contested
issue .... Rather it is the right to defend which the hypothetical statute would
involve, and that would bring into view the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination rather than the Sixth Amendment jury right.
Id. at 271-72, 245 A.2d at 185.
31. 52 N.J. at 279, 245 A.2d at 189. The New Jersey court recognized, however,
that the federal defendant's right was not absolute because the trial judge could refuse
to accept it, but felt that the plea would not be refused if the defendant was com-
petent and his guilty plea was consonant with the facts. The court read Jackson as
indicating that the federal trial court could not have refused the plea because it thought
that capital punishment might be warranted. Id. at 279 n.8, 245 A.2d at 189-90 n.8.
32. The New Jersey statute distinguishes guilty pleas and pleas of non vult,
although they are, in practical effect, equivalent. N.J. Riv. ST'AT. § 2A :113-3 (1953).
See note 2 supra.
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to plead non vult, since the acceptance of the plea is within the discretion
of the trial judge.33
Secondly, non vult pleas were characterized by the court as not "need-
less" in light of the standards established by Jackson. In considering those
standards, Chief Justice Weintraub emphasized the Supreme Court's use
of the words "needless" and "unnecessary" to illustrate a fundamental
difference between the fifth and sixth amendment problems:
As to the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial, the burden of the
federal statute could only be "needless," for it can serve no legitimate
end to make the penalty turn on whether the accused defended before
a jury or before a judge alone. But when the focus is upon the Fifth
Amendment, i.e., the impact upon the right to defend, other values
come into play and may demonstrate that the incidental impact upon
that right is not "needless" or "unnecessary" or "excessive.
' 3 4
An examination of the legislative history of the New Jersey statute showed
that the only alternative available to the court would be to eliminate the
subsequently enacted non vult procedure and therefore require that all
defendants submit to a trial by jury. Since the Supreme Court in Jackson
had stated that such a requirement would be "cruel" and would "rob the
criminal process of much of its flexibility," 35 the Forcella majority con-
cluded that the non vult plea was not "needless" because
our statute was not designed to coerce non vult pleas; it was intended
to operate ...to the benefit of defendants as a group. The purpose
is humane, and so is its overall impact. The alternative would be
"cruel" . . . for it would require all defendants to undergo a trial
and to do so at the risk of life.30
As a further ground for upholding the non vult procedure, the majority
noted that there is "respectable support" for plea bargaining 37 and that
33. 52 N.J. at 279-80, 245 A.2d at 190. See State v. Belton, 48 N.J. 432, 226 A.2d
425 (1967) ; State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 203 A.2d 177 (1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 990 (1966). See also In re Waiver of Death Penalty, 45 N.J. 501, 213 A.2d 20
(1965), where the court held that the prosecutor has the discretion not to seek the
death penalty, and if he so decides and the court approves, the death penalty cannot be
returned by the jury.
34. 52 N.J. at 274, 245 A.2d at 186.
35, 390 U.S. at 584.
36. 52 N.J. at 280, 245 A.2d at 190.
37. See Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D. Ore. 1963), aff'd, 327
F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 971 (1964); State v. Taylor, 40
N.J. 440, 455, 231 A.2d 212, 221 (1967); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337,
345-50, 223 A.2d 699, 703-06 (1966) ; TASK FORCE RzeORT: TIsE COURTS 9-11 (The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967);
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS ov GUILTY §§ 3.1-3.4 (A.B.A. Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Tent. Draft 1967) ; Breitel, Controls in Criminal
Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427, 432 (1960) ; Newman, Pleading Guilty
for Consideration: A Study of Bargained Justice, 46 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 780
(1956) ; Polstein, How To "Settle" A Criminal Case, 8 PRAc. LAW. 35, 37 (1962) ;
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas,
112 U. PA. L. Rv. 865, 881, 899 (1965). But see Folberg, The "Bargained For"
Guilty Plea - An Evaluation, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 201, 210-11 (1968).
[VOL. 14
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss2/5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
sentencing judges give great weight to guilty pleas because one who con-
fesses is considered a better prospect for rehabilitation.38
By deciding as it did, then, the New Jersey supreme court not only
upheld the non vult procedure but also preserved the death penalty provision
of the homicide statute. The majority recognized, however, that their
reading of the Jackson decision might be incorrect, and therefore felt
constrained to emphasize that if Jackson should be held to apply, all
New Jersey defendants to murder indictments would be forced to go to
trial and face the possibility of the jury returning a verdict of guilty
without a recommendation of life imprisonment.39 Moreover, the court
added, the sequence of events and enactments that led to the present
statutes dictates this result, for nowhere in the legislative history40 of
either the murder statute or the non vult provision is there anything to
indicate an intent on the part of the legislature that "the death penalty
should fall if the introduction of the non vult plea created a constitu-
tional impasse."'41
Justices Jacobs and Hall in dissent found that the New Jersey pro-
cedure, in operative effect, places an even greater burden on a defendant's
constitutional rights than the federal procedure. They noted that a New
Jersey defendant can avoid the death penalty only by tendering a plea of
non vult and that such a plea results in a waiver of both the right against
self-incrimination and the right to trial by jury. In contrast, under the
federal procedure a defendant could avoid the death penalty without for-
feiting the right against self-incrimination by simply choosing to defend
before a judge.42
An analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson and that of
the New Jersey court in Forcella raises a number of points of divergence.
First, the two courts seemed to approach the problem differently. Mr.
Justice Stewart clearly defined the issue in Jackson to be whether it is
constitutionally permissible to establish a capital punishment provision
"applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their
guilt before a jury. '43 The Forcella court, on the other hand, concentrated
primarily on distinguishing the federal and the state procedures, and as a
result never reached the issue as it was framed by the Supreme Court.
Had the New Jersey court done so, it would have been apparent that
the two procedures are constitutionally indistinguishable. The death penalty
provisions of the New Jersey homicide statute apply only to those de-
fendants convicted of murder before a jury. This is the exact procedure
38. State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 203, 162 A.2d 851, 854 (1960). See Comment,
The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE
L.J. 204 (1956).
39. 52 N.J. at 280-81, 245 A.2d at 190-92.
40. See State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 241-47, 203 A.2d 177, 194-97 (1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 990 (1966).
41. 52 N.J. at 283, 245 A.2d at 191.
42. Id. at 298, 245 A.2d at 199.
43. 390 U.S. at 581.
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that the Jackson Court found constitutionally defective. The "inevitable
effect" of such a procedure, Jackson declared, was "to discourage assertion"
of the right against self-incrimination and "to deter exercise" of the right
to trial by jury.44 Since the federal and the state procedures are indis-
tinguishable, the "inevitable effect" of the New Jersey scheme must there-
fore be the same.
Moreover, since the Jackson Court defined the issue and framed its
holding in terms of both fifth and sixth amendment rights, it is apparent
that the Forcella court's treatment of the effect of the New Jersey pro-
cedure on each right separately was improper. As a result of this separate
treatment, the New Jersey court's distinctions become illusory. The sixth
amendment distinction is premised on a court rule barring jury waivers in
all murder cases. 45 It is true, as the Forcella court argues, that a New
Jersey defendant has no option to defend the issue of guilt before a judge
as did a defendant tried under the Federal Kidnaping Act. However, this
fact does not eliminate the sixth amendment issue, because when a de-
fendant's plea of non vult is accepted both his right against self-incrimina-
tion and his right to a jury trial are necessarily waived. The dissent in
Forcella appears to have reached the heart of the matter by pointing out
that a New Jersey defendant's plight is even more desperate than was the
federal defendant's - for the latter at least had the option of avoiding
the threat of death without incriminating himself.40 No such middle ground
is available in New Jersey; the price of avoiding death is the waiver of all
rights, including the right to a jury trial.
The Forcella court's fifth amendment distinctions fail to recognize the
operative effect of a non vult plea as equivalent to that of a guilty plea and
for this reason are also in direct conflict with the rationale of the Jackson
Court. Chief Justice Weintraub also emphasized that acceptance or rejec-
tion of a non vult plea does not improperly induce waiver of fifth amend-
ment rights since such is entirely within the discretion of the trial judge.
The possibility that some pleas may be rejected, however, does not curtail
the primary evil of the non vult procedure - the needless encouragement
of guilty pleas and jury waivers. 47 Additionally, the fact that the New
Jersey statute was designed to benefit defendants rather than to coerce
non vult pleas should not be accorded special significance in the realm of
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Concededly, a legislative objective to
benefit defendants is laudatory, but Jackson held that such benefits cannot be
offered by means that needlessly chill the assertion of fundamental rights.48
Ultimately, the conclusion of the Forcella majority was that the New
Jersey procedure was not "needless" according to its understanding of the
standards enunciated in Jackson. Chief Justice Weintraub felt that the only
judicial course of action open to the New Jersey supreme court under
44. Id.
45. N.J. Rtv. RULE 3:7-1(a). See note 29 supra.
46. 52 N.J. at 298, 245 A.2d at 199.
47. 390 U.S. at 583.
48. Id. at 582.
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the legislative history of its homicide statute was to require all defendants
to undergo trial at the risk of their lives. Since the Jackson Court had
characterized such a remedy as "cruel" and one that robs the criminal
process of needed flexibility,49 Justice Weintraub concluded that the non
vult procedure could not be considered constitutionally "needless" or
"unnecessary" or "excessive."5 0 This reasoning, however, does not com-
port with a proper analysis of Jackson. In order to establish a standard
to determine whether the federal procedure was needless, the Jackson
Court looked to other statutory alternatives available, and cited with favor
a procedure which allows the issue of punishment to be decided by a
jury in every capital case, regardless of how guilt had been determined.5 1
Since this other constitutionally acceptable procedure existed, Mr. Justice
Stewart concluded that the federal scheme was needless. The Forcella
majority, on the other hand, did not look to other statutory alternatives
as the criterion for judging the threshold constitutional question of need-
lessness, but looked only to the language in Jackson which pertained to
the "cruelty" of a given judicial remedy. Since none was available other
than requiring every defendant to stand trial, the court considered its
procedure to be constitutional. In effect, the New Jersey court incor-
rectly reasoned that because there was only a cruel judicial remedy avail-
able, there was no impermissible burden on constitutional rights. There
is no doubt that Chief Justice Weintraub faced a dilemma - either to
contravene legislative intent by striking the death penalty from the homi-
cide statute or uphold an unconstitutional procedure. The former should
have been chosen because, as the dissent pointed out,52 such a result would
be in line with the growing public disapproval of capital punishment53
and recent Supreme Court decisions. 54 Furthermore, the elimination of
the death penalty would have the collateral effect of compelling the legis-
lature to restudy the New Jersey homicide procedure with an eye towards
49. Id. at 584.
50. 52 N.J. at 274, 245 A.2d at 190.
51. WASH. Rev. CODE §§ 9.48.030, 10.49.010 (1956).
52. 52 N.J. at 300-01, 245 A.2d at 201.
53. In 1960, approximately 51 percent of the American public favored capital
punishment, while 36 percent opposed it and 13 percent were undecided. By 1966, the
trend had reversed, with only 42 percent in favor of capital punishment, and 47 percent
opposed, the remaining 11 percent being undecided. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 520, n.16 (1968). See generally Balogh & Green, Capital Punishment: Some
Reflections, 30 FED. PROBATION 24 (1966) ; Sellin, Capital Punishment, 8 CRIM. L.Q.
36 (1965).
54. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 37 FORDHAM
L. Rev. 129 (1968), 82 HARV. L. REv. 162 (1968), 14 N.Y.L.F. 373 (1968), 21 VAND.
L. Rtv. 864 (1968), 14 VILL. L. REv. 125 (1968), and 3 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 864(1968), where the Supreme Court declared invalid an Illinois statute which provided
for the exclusion in murder trials of any juror who stated that he had conscientious
scruples against capital punishment or was opposed to it; Pope v. United States, 392
U.S. 651 (1968), where in a per curiam opinion, the Court struck down the death
penalty clause of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1964), for the
same reasons expressed in Jackson but without reference to the severability of the
capital punishment clause
15
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more modern policies and procedures5 5 This effect would also be con-
sonant with the ultimate aim implicit in Jackson, i.e., that the final cure
must come from the legislature.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the New Jersey supreme court im-
properly applied United States v. Jackson and consequently upheld a con-
stitutionally defective procedure. The net result of the Forcella decision is
that it leaves the constitutionality of the New Jersey non vult plea in doubt.
The New Jersey supreme court was presented with the opportunity to
apply the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson as it was meant to be
applied. 0 In this respect they failed, and, as the dissent noted:
[A] most unfortunate aspect of the majority opinion, which disserves
the public greatly, is that it reaches out to sanction completely the
status quo thereby jeopardizing impending murder proceedings and
lending itself to legislative inaction in a field which cries out for
early action.57
Warren W. Faulk
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - PRISON ADMINIS-
TRATION - STATE PRISON INMATE'S CLAIM OF WRONGFUL DENIAL
OF PAROLE HEARING STATES A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION IN A FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate (7th Cir. 1968)
Appellant Campbell, an inmate in an Illinois state penitentiary, sued
for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act of 18711
55. 52 N.J. at 301, 245 A.2d at 201.
56. Recently, three other state supreme courts have considered the application of
United States v. Jackson to their respective capital punishment practices. North
Carolina, in State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968), found that its
statutes were distinguishable from the federal scheme on grounds similar to those
expressed in Forcella, and therefore upheld the procedures involved. In State v.
Harper -..... S.C -..... , 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968), the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that its capital punishment provisions, which were identical to those at issue in
Peele, were condemned by the Jackson holding and therefore ruled that in the future
the choice between imprisonment and the death penalty must be left to the jury in
every case, regardless of how guilt had been determined. Id. at --. -, 162 S.E.2d at 715.
The third decision, by the Mississippi supreme court in King v. Cook, 211 So. 2d 517
(Miss. 1968), although deciding that the Jackson rule should not be applied retro-
spectively, noted that the case law of Mississippi provides a procedure whereby the
issue of punishment can be submitted to the jury even where the defendant pleads
guilty. See Yates v. State, 253 Miss. 424, 175 So. 2d 617, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 931
(1965) ; Yates v. State, 251 Miss. 376, 169 So. 2d 792 (1964) ; Dickerson v. State,
202 Miss. 804, 32 So. 2d 881 (1947).
57. 52 N.J. at 301, 245 A.2d at 201.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
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seeking to have his proposed hearing before the parole board reinstated.
The appellant claimed that the hearing was unfairly postponed after prison
guards allegedly found in appellant's cell five medicine bottles which
prison authorities claimed, without analyzing the bottles' contents, con-
tained an illegal compound. Campbell insisted the bottles contained a soft
drink powder, Tang, available to prisoners. He argued that the warden's
assumption that the powder was an illegal compound was unfounded and
therefore the postponement of the hearing, and thus the opportunity for
parole, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment. 2
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that when the state penal
system has adopted a rule which has the effect of denying or postponing
a parole hearing as punishment for an offense, that rule cannot be so
capriciously or unreliably applied without violating the appellant's right
to equal protection of the law.8 United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate,
401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968).
Both state and federal courts have been reluctant to interfere with
either the administration of state penitentiaries or the treatment of in-
mates.4 The rationale traditionally espoused by state courts to support
this policy was that the convicted criminal not only forfeited his liberty
but also his personal rights, i.e., by incarceration an inmate became a
"slave" of the state.5 As late as 1950, the majority of federal courts
maintained the general position that it was not their function to supervise
the treatment and discipline of prisoners 6 and that the regulation of state
prisons was a state administrative function not reviewable by the federal
courts.7 Intervention was strictly limited to review of complaints of illegal
imprisonment under writs of habeas corpus.8
2. Brief for Appellant at 12, United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55(7th Cir. 1968).
3. U.S. CONST'. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
5. People v. Russell, 245 Ill. 268, 91 N.E. 1075 (1910) ; Ruffin v. Commonwealth,
62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
6. E.g., Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957)
(denial of access to legal books); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955) (denial of correspondence with court); United
States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846
(1954) (denial of use of the mails) ; United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station
WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953) (claim of racial discrimination); Nichols v.
McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959) (claim of
racial discrimination).
7. This view is supported by the Federal Prisons and Prisoners Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001 (1964), which withdraws federal prison administration from the courts and
places it within the authority of the Attorney General. See Walker v. Blackwell, 360
F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966).
8. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1951); Sarshik v. Sanford,
142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944); Platek v. Adherhold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934).
Article I, section 9 of the Constitution specifically guarantees the availability
of habeas corpus in times of peace.
WINTER 1969]
17
Britton: Bankruptcy - Tax Liens - 1966 Amendment to Section 17a(1) of the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
As early as 1944, at least one federal court had adopted a more liberal
view with respect to intervention. In Coffin v. Reichard,9 the sixth circuit
took specific issue with the prevailing state court rationale that prisoners
surrendered their rights as well as their liberty 10 when it stated that
"[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."'" More
recently, other federal courts have indicated a willingness to inquire into
the internal affairs of state penitentiaries where, under exceptional cir-
cumstances, constitutional guarantees were alleged to have been violated. 12
It should be noted that due to procedural limitations imposed by the
Supreme Court on habeas corpus proceedings, 13 actions by inmates con-
cerning their treatment and the administration of state prisons are presently
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.14 However, increased federal
intervention appears to be based more on a change in judicial attitude and
philosophy rather than on a change in procedure. 1
The adoption of a more liberal position by federal courts raises the
threshold problem of the extent to which federal courts should intervene
into the administration of state penitentiaries and treatment of prisoners.
As one court has stated, a middle ground must be found between leaving
inmates to the mercy of state prison officials and the complete judicial
operation of prisons. 16
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 under which inmate Campbell brought
his action17 protects the constitutional rights of individuals from persons
acting under color of state sovereign authority,' 8 and it has generally been
9. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
10. See cases cited note 5 supra.
11. 143 F.2d at 445.
12. See, e.g., Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Knight v. Ragen,
337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910
(9th Cir. 1957).
13. In Johnson v. Dye, 338 U.S. 864, rev'g 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), the
Supreme Court held that an inmate must exhaust state remedies before bringing an
action under a writ of habeas corpus.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), quoted in note 1 supra.
15. See Comment, Prisoner's Remedies For Mistreatment, 59 YALx L.J. 800,
808 (1950).
16. United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y,
1953).
17. District courts have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 which pro-
vides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States . ...
Also, there is no need to exhaust state remedies before bringing the action
in district court. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1960) ; York v. Story,
324 F.2d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D.
Ark. 1965).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), quoted in note 1 supra.
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held that the broad jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Act encompasses the
protection of state prison inmates.19 The problem confronting the court
in Campbell was to determine what constitutional rights are protected under
the Civil Rights Act and what action adversely affecting those rights is
therefore reviewable by federal courts. More specifically, the issue was
whether the 11-month delay of the parole hearing, because the prison
warden had determined without any scientific proof or analysis that the
appellant possessed an illegal compound, deprived the appellant of any
right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act. Such a
determination is difficult because the areas and degrees of intervention by
federal courts have varied greatly in these cases. 20 One federal court
frankly admitted that it was unable to discover any common thread run-
ning through the cases in which federal courts had thus far intervened.2 1
However, it would appear that where there is a specific constitutional pro-
hibition against certain action, such as the first or eighth amendment,
federal courts have been more inclined to find a cause of action under the
Civil Rights Act than if reliance is placed on a general constitutional
protection such as equal protection or due process. Therefore, claims of
extreme and unwarranted denial of religious freedoms have usually been
heard by federal courts. 22 The federal judiciary has also been willing to
examine and intervene where the complaint alleges a violation of the eighth
amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment 23 as well as
to guarantee inmates the right to competent medical care and facilities. 24
In addition, most courts have agreed that the inmates' access to state and
federal courts should be vigorously protected.25 Surprisingly, federal courts
have not as yet accorded the right to be free from racial segregation the
same protection as religion, access to courts, or freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment.26
Petitioner Campbell, obviously cognizant of the areas into which the
federal courts had intervened, alleged a violation of the eighth amendment.
19. E.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) ; Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992(9th Cir. 1966) ; Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963) ; United States ex rel.
Diamond v. Social Serv. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967). But see United
States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
20. For a thorough study of prisoner's rights up to this time, see Comment, The
Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. Rgv. 397 (1965).
21. Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1961).
22. E.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) ; Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233(2d Cir. 1961). The primary difficulty is in regard to protecting the religious rights
of minor sects, especially the militant Black Muslims. Compare Childs v. Pegelow,
321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964) with Fulwood v.
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
23. E.g., Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) ; Talley v.Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) ; see Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477
(E.D. I1. 1948).
24. E.g., Elsberry v. Haynes, 256 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Okla. 1966) ; McCollum
v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
25. E.g., Jenks v. Henys, 378 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Kirby v. Thomas, 336
F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1964).
26. E.g., United States v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953);
Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
But see Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964).
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However, the seventh circuit rejected the claim that the warden's decision
to postpone Campbell's hearing for parole amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment or a violation of any other of the imnate's constitutional rights
which federal courts had thus far protected, but rather held that the
inmate's right to equal protection of the law had been violated. The court
reasoned that the warden's decision, which had the effect of postponing
the parole hearing, was too capriciously or unreliably determined, i.e.,
lacked a rational basis. 27
The Campbell decision is significant in that it appears to be the first
time under the Civil Rights Act that a federal court has actually guaranteed
state prison inmates equal protection of the law,28 as well as the first time
that intervention has reached, at least to a limited degree, into the internal
decision-making process of a state prison official. 29 Previously, federal
courts had never intervened into the actual administrative process of a
prison but had limited their intervention to instances where the treatment
of prisoners was involved.30 By holding that an inmate has a right to
equal protection of the law, the court in Campbell has taken an important
step toward further protecting the constitutional rights of state prisoners
which have not been necessarily taken away by their confinement.
The court, however, limited this forward step by refusing to base its
decision on due process.3 ' The adoption of equal protection and the
specific rejection of due process enabled the court to make a subtle but
far-reaching distinction between these closely related concepts. The seventh
circuit appears to have reasoned that since the State of Illinois had a
rational system of classification to determine when a prisoner was eligible
for his parole hearing32 and since all prisoners were classified according to
that system, to so capriciously and arbitrarily reclassify the petitioner
would be to deny him equal protection of the law. Thus, it was the peti-
tioner's right to be reasonably classified, as were the other prisoners, that
27. The court in a brief, but unanimous decision stated: "We think that the
relevant facts which trigger the operation of the rule must not be so capriciously or
unreliably determined that, in effect, the inmate is deprived of equal protection of the
laws." United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55, 57 (7th Cir. 1968).
28. Although a federal district court in Arkansas based its decision primarily on
a violation of cruel and unusual punishment by state prison authorities, the court said:
Although persons convicted of crimes lose many of the rights and privileges
of law abiding citizens, it is established by now that they do not lose all of their
civil rights, and that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th
Amendment follow them into the prison and protect them there from unconstitu-
tional administrative action on the part of prison authorities carried out under
color of State law, custom, or usage.
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
29. In Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967), the court intervened into
the internal decision-making process of state prison officials but only because the
inmate's privilege to the writ of habeas corpus had been violated by the internal
administrative procedure of the state prison. The action was not brought under the
Civil Rights Act and did not involve the question of whether the internal administra-
tion of a state prison must conform to federal standards of equal protection.
30. See cases cited in notes 22, 23, 24, and 25 supra.
31. 401 F.2d at 57.
32. For a description of the classification system, see People v. Kinney, 30 Ill.
2d 201, 195 N.E.2d 651 (1964).
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the court seems to indicate was being denied by the warden's actions.
However, the court's brief and cryptic discussion of its use of the equal
protection doctrine necessarily raises some doubt as to whether this is the
exact basis for its adoption of this concept.
There are two possible explanations why the court in Campbell was
careful to exclude due process as a possible ground for its decision. First,
the use of the equal protection theory obviates the necessity of federal
court interference with the internal decision-making process of state prison
officials beyond guaranteeing that the administrators reach any decisions
concerning the inmates in a uniform manner - even if the process flag-
rantly violates due process - thereby avoiding the danger of complete
judicial operation of prisons. Secondly, the Supreme Court has defined
equal protection in more concrete terms than it has the due process clause. 33
By specifically limiting its holding to an equal protection rationale, the
court may have been attempting to prevent a deluge of actions concerning
the internal administration of state prisons which could be brought by
prisoners under the more vague concept of due process. Additionally, it
would appear that the court was concerned with the practical ramifications
of holding due process applicable to prisons for fear that its opinion would
be read as a stepping-stone toward allowing all the specific guarantees
which due process encompasses in other situations, 34 to be applied to the
prison situation.
However, the acknowledgment that prisoners have a right to equal
protection of the law while not according them the rights of due process
raises several problems. The Supreme Court has indicated that since both
the due process and equal protection clauses stem from the ideal of fair-
ness, they are not completely separable or mutually exclusive.3 5 If courts
grant an inmate the right to equal protection of the law, it is difficult to
conceive a persuasive legal rationale for not likewise granting due process.
Once due process is granted, however, the further problem arises as to
how the courts will translate this concept into the prison. Although it is
arguable that all the specific guarantees applicable in other situations will
now be extended to include the inmate, it is unlikely that the courts are
ready to take such a far-reaching step but rather will attempt to define due
process as it relates to the unique situation of prison administration. For
33. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964) ;
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879) ; Avins,
The Equal "Protection" Of The Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F.
385 (1966); Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 205
(1964).
34. Some of the specific guarantees which due process has been held to encompass
in other situations include: Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964) (right of accused
to confront witnesses in federal and state "proceedings") ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in criminal prosecution) ; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961) (right of criminally accused to fair hearing) ; Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196 (1947) (right of accused to notice and to defend in criminal proceedings);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (right of notice and opportunity to be
heard in criminal and civil trials).
35. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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example, the courts may well be satisfied that due process has been met
if they are convinced that decisions which affect prisoners are made on
a rational basis. In the instant case this could have been satisfied if the
warden had been able to submit to the court an affidavit that the compound
was in fact an illegal one. Moreover, the courts could further limit due
process by defining it to apply to only those situations where the inmates
are adversely affected to a substantial degree by prison officials. Not every
administrative decision affecting the inmates need be consonant with due
process of law.
From the complaint in the instant case, it appears that the warden's
decision to reduce the petitioner's classification, which substantially and
adversely affected his status, was not made on a rational basis and hence
petitioner's rights, whether couched in terms of equal protection or due
process, were violated. Since the purpose of our prison system is to re-
habilitate and return these inmates to society, the federal courts should
not be reluctant to protect more completely the constitutional rights of
state prison inmates and to subject the internal decision-making process
of prison officials to the federal standards of both equal protection and
due process.8 6 In Campbell, the seventh circuit has taken a very important,
if limited, step toward providing this protection.
Carl D. Buchholz III
TAXATION - MULTIPLE ACCUMULATIVE TRUSTS - CREATION OF 20
SIMILAR TRUSTS FROM SAME GRANTORS TO SAME BENEFICIARIES FOR
THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF TAX AVOIDANCE HELD VALID UNDER
SECTION 641 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
Estelle Morris Trusts (T.C. 1968)
In 1953 the grantors executed 10 irrevocable' declarations of trust
which directed the trustee, subject to certain discretionary provisions,2 to
accumulate8 the income from the trust for the life of each of two primary
beneficiaries and to distribute the principal and accumulated income upon
36. Comment, supra note 20.
1. If the grantor has the power to revoke a trust, the income earned from the
trust will be taxed to the grantor, whether or not he exercises his option to revoke.
INT. RiV. CODE of 1954, § 676(a).
2. The declarations of trust included an emergency clause which gave the trustee
the power to distribute income and principal to either beneficiary upon a showing that
he was unable to maintain his accustomed standard of living.
3. If the income earned from a trust is currently distributed (simple trust),
rather than accumulated for a certain period of years (complex trust), the beneficiary
will be taxed on the current income whether or not tile income is actually distributed.
INT. RAv. CODI of 1954, § 652(a).
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their deaths to other trusts to be created for their surviving issue.4 The
10 declarations were similar in form except for differing periods of in-
come accumulation and distribution, and differing termination dates. Al-
though the trust property under each declaration was pooled for admin-
istrative convenience, each trust declaration was administered separately
and acquired separate investments. 5
In 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed deficiencies
against the trusts for the years 1961 through 1965, alleging that only
one, or at most two, trusts were created by the 10 instruments, and that
the attempted creation of 20 trusts and the filing of 20 separate income
tax returns each year was done primarily for tax avoidance purposes.
Petitioner trustee challenged the deficiencies, claiming that 20 separate
trusts were created by the 10 instruments, and that the primary purpose
for creating the trusts was not tax avoidance. It was further argued that
even if the primary purpose was tax avoidance, the trusts could none-
theless be taxed as separate legal entities absent a Code provision pro-
hibiting separate taxation of multiple trusts.
The Tax Court found for the petitioner, holding that (1) each trust
declaration created two separate trusts; (2) the grantors created 20 rather
than two trusts principally for tax avoidance reasons; and (3) even
though tax avoidance motive was present, each of the 20 trusts qualified
as a separate taxable entity under section 641(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 6 Estelle Morris Trusts, 51 T.C. No. 4 (Oct. 9, 1968).
Initially, under the Revenue Act of 1916,7 Congress declared that
income from trusts if accumulated rather than currently distributed to
the beneficiary would be taxable to the trust as a separate legal entity
in like manner as the income tax on individuals. Since a trust is taxed
as a separate entity, it is highly advantageous to divide income-producing
property and place it into several trusts. By this method of "bracket-
splitting," each trust pays taxes at lower rates applicable to its propor-
tionate share of the split income rather than one trust paying the higher
4. The trust declaration contained a clause whereby each trust would accumulate
its income for at least 10 years, even if both primary beneficiaries died prior to that
time. The purpose of this clause was to avoid falling within the "Clifford" rule,
whereby a grantor will be taxed on current trust income if he has some reversionary
interest which, as of the inception of the trust, may take effect within 10 years from
the trust's formation. INT. Rv. CODE Of 1954, § 673.
5. The 20 Morris trusts were combined with multiple accumulative trusts
similarly created by two other families, and together they purchased approximately
700 or 800 acres of property which they then subdivided and listed separately by tract
for each trust estate.
6. Section 641 provides in relevant part:(a) APPLICATION OF TAX. - The taxes imposed by this chapter on individuals
shall apply to the taxable income of estates or of any kind of property
held in trust, including-(1) . . . income accumulated or held for future distribution under the
terms of the will or trust . . ..
INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 641 (a) (1).
7. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(b), 39 Stat. 756.
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tax rate applicable to the entire income of an undivided res.8 Thus the
use of multiple trusts, particularly in a family context, has the special
advantage of substantially reducing income tax liability by spreading the
income among several taxable entities.
Evidence of the widespread use of multiple trusts for tax avoidance
reasons was revealed in a Message from the President to Congress in
1937. 9 At that time the only action taken by Congress was to lower the
trust exemption, similar to an individual's personal exemption of $600,10
from $1000 to $100.11 Subsequently, the drafters of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 incorporated the "5-year throwback" rule12 which restricted
the manipulation of income distribution to the beneficiary by providing
that in any year in which the amount distributed to the beneficiary exceeds
the net income for that year, the part which represents the excess over
current income is "thrown back" to each of 5 preceding years in inverse
order and taxed to the beneficiary as if the income had been distributed
in those years. 13 While the "throwback" rule placed some restrictions
on trust distributions, it had little, if any, effect on the formation of
multiple trusts.14 Finally, in 1957, a House Advisory Group proposed an
amendment 5 to section 641 which essentially would have taxed as one
the combined income of multiple trusts when the beneficiaries were sub-
stantially the same. 16 This amendment, however, failed to reach the Senate
floor for a vote, and since that time no new congressional action has been
taken to restrict the formation of multiple trusts.
In the instant case the court was faced with two issues: whether one
or many trusts was created by the trust instrument and, if multiple trusts
were created for tax avoidance reasons, whether such trusts should be
separately taxed or taxed as one entity. Prior to the Morris case, courts
confronted with similar multiple trust situations based their decisions
solely on a determination of the number of trusts actually created without
considering the effect of tax avoidance. 17 The usual rule applicable to
8. See Note, Multiple Trusts and the Minimization of Federal Taxes, 40 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 309, 310 (1940).
9. H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 260, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937).
10. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 151.
11. INT. Rtv. CODE of 1954, § 642(b).
12. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 666.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.666(a)-1(a) (1960).
14. Since the "throwback" rule effectively acts to discourage the trustee from
accumulating income for a few years, only to distribute it in a year when the taxpayer
is in a favorable low tax bracket, it has been suggested that the rule actually encour-
ages the creation of multiple trusts. By creating enough trusts, the trustee could
accumulate most of the income and pay out the accumulation to the beneficiary in a
steady flow without the beneficiary being taxed on the accumulated income. See
Friedman & Wheeler, Effective Use of Multiple Trusts, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 967 (1958).
15. H.R. 3041, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
16. See Hearings on Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and Decedents Before House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 2757 (1958). For adetailed analysis of this proposed legislation, see Tomlinson, Critical Analysis of
Proposed Law on Multiple Trust Taxation, 96 TR. & EST. 1180 (1957).
17. Comment, Taxation of Multiple Trusts, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 156, 161 (1956).
But see p. 352 infra.
346 [VOL. 14
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss2/5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
such a determination is that the number of trusts created is governed by
the intent of the grantor measured by all the circumstances.' 8 One cri-
terion often used in determining intent is whether singular or plural terms
were used in the trust instrument. Courts have often concluded that the
use of singular terms evidences the creation of only one trust,19 whereas
the use of plural terms signifies the creation of multiple trusts. 20 Also,
when the beneficiaries are different in each trust, or when the number
of contested trusts are few (e.g., three or four), the different criteria
have generally been weighed in favor of the taxpayer.21 When, however,
the beneficiaries in each trust are the same and the number of trusts is
large, some courts have applied a test of "special or close scrutiny" 22 and
have refused to recognize the existence of more than one trust when
any slight factor may be detrimental to the taxpayer's position.
In the instant case the Commissioner argued that the use of such
terms as "this trust" and "the trust estate" in the instruments was con-
trolling and determinative of the grantor's intent to establish only one
trust.28 The trustee, on the other hand, contended that the singular terms
used in the instrument made reference only to the administration of the
combined trust assets and, as such, were not unusual when viewed in the
totality of the trust terms. On the basis of the general rule set forth
in United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner,24 the court first stated that
two or more trusts may be created by one instrument in an undivided
res by the same grantor for different beneficiaries. 25 Upon this premise
the court reasoned that the occasional use of singular terms in the in-
strument is "not inconsistent with the creation of separate trusts if read
in the context of the whole instrument, particularly in light of the authority
18. United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481 (1936) ; McHarg v.
Fitzpatrick, 210 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1954); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Kelly, 102
F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 876
(6th Cir. 1937).
19. In Marian Neal Trusts, 40 B.T.A. 1033, 1037 (1939), the Tax Court stated:
"While terminology alone is not conclusive, the frequent references to a single trust
require that indications of a contrary intention should be clear." See also McGinley v.
Commissioner, 80 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Fiduciary Trust Co. v. United States,
36 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Contra, Kohtz Family Trust, 5 T.C. 554 (1945).
20. E.g., MacManus v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1942); Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Kelly, 102 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Union Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 84 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1936).
21. See cases cited note 20 supra and note 25 infra.
22. Boyce v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam,
296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Sence v. United States, 394 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
23. The trust instrument, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
(A) DESIGNATION OF PROPERTY
The Trustee shall apportion the Trust Estate into two (2) equal
shares ....
(E) POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE
[F]or the sake of convenience in acquiring, holding, and managing
such shares, the Trustee shall not be required to partition any property
of this Trust received by him .... [emphasis added].
Estelle Morris Trusts, 51 T.C. No. 4, at 2885-86 (Oct. 9, 1968).
24. 296 U.S. 481 (1936).
25. See Fiduciary Trust Co. v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
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given the trustee to combine the assets for administrative convenience." '26
In the instant case, the meticulous administration of each trust as a
separate entity was an overriding consideration in the Tax Court's ap-
plication of the "close scrutiny" test. The court stated that the use of
separate income and expense accounts, different termination dates, dif-
ferent periods of income accumulation and distribution, 10 separate check-
ing accounts, and the filing of 20 separate income tax returns, one for
each trust, could only lead to the conclusion that, even under "close scru-
tiny," 20 separate trusts existed.27
The finding of separate trusts in the Morris case is indicative of the
inadequacy of the "close scrutiny" test and represents the first time that
a court has unequivocally allowed multiple trusts to be taxed separately
after having found that the primary purpose for creating the trusts was
tax avoidance.2 8 In so holding, the court weighed heavily the fact that
Congress had been inactive in passing legislation to limit the use of
multiple trusts when it had full knowledge of the existing tax loophole,29
and on this basis construed the Code provisions literally in favor of the
petitioner.30
Congress' failure to act, however, should not have led the court to
its conclusion that the legislature had given implied approval to the use
of multiple trusts as a means of tax avoidance. Other reasons for con-
gressional inactivity are apparent. First, there are many valid non-tax
reasons for creating multiple trusts and, as several authors have sug-
gested,3 1 it is for these reasons that Congress has indicated a desire not
to eliminate separate taxation. It seems clear that multiple trusts are
useful and perhaps necessary to serve different investment needs where
the nature of the assets requires different trusts and different trustees
in order to make sound business investments. Multiple trusts are also
used to designate different remaindermen and to recognize different uses
for the trust income - e.g., one trust for living expenses and another to
finance the beneficiary's education. Moreover, the legislative history of
26. 51 T.C. No. 4, at 2897.
27. Id. at 2902-03.
28. See Brief for Respondent at 83-84, Estelle Morris Trusts, 51 T.C. No. 4(Oct. 9, 1968). The court found that the grantor wished to subdivide and develop
certain land and was aware that in so doing, the value of the property would be
greatly enhanced. It was primarily for this reason that the grantor created multiple
trusts to purchase the property and thus spread capital gains received from sale of
the subdivided property res to many separate taxable entities. Furthermore, since
the trusts were used to buy and sell other real estate, the creation of a large number
of trusts, each making only a few sales, would prevent the possibility of a single trust
being considered to be in the business of buying and selling real estate and therefore
each trust could receive capital gains treatment from its own separate sales. (Under
INT. REv. COD of 1954, § 1221(a), real property used in the taxpayer's business is
not a capital asset, and gains from the sale of such property are not accorded capital
gains treatment.)
29. See note 16 supra.
30. 51 T.C. No. 4, at 2901; cf. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 565-66, 579(1965) ; American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 694-97 (1961).
31. Friedman & Wheeler, supra note 14; Soter, Federal Taxation Aspects of
Multiple-Accumulation Trusts, 31 U. CINN. L. Rtv. 351 (1962).
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the rejected proposals 32 suggests that Congress' failure to change the law
was a result of its inability to reach an agreement as to what was the
appropriate method of eliminating the loophole rather than an implicit
approval of stockpiling trusts within section 641 in order to avoid in-
dividual tax liability.
The Commissioner also argued that, notwithstanding the lack of a
specific Code section prohibiting the use of multiple trusts for tax avoid-
ance reasons, the court could have used a "substance versus form" ap-
proach to determine that, apart from anticipated tax benefits, the trusts
were without substance. In the landmark case of Gregory v. Helvering,3 3
the Supreme Court held that a corporate reorganization, used solely to
liquidate and distribute a parent corporation's assets at a tax saving to
the shareholders, lacked a valid "business purpose," and thus the entire
distribution was treated as a taxable dividend. Likewise, in Knetsch
v. United States34 and Weller v. Commissioner,3 5 interest expense de-
ductions were disallowed on notes used to purchase annuities which had
a lower rate of return than the interest-bearing notes themselves. In both
cases it was held that the transactions lacked "economic reality."
The Morris court rejected a "business purpose" or "economic reality"
approach as inapposite since allowance of the tax benefits in Gregory,
Knetsch, and Weller would have frustrated the legislative purposes of
the controlling statutes 6 and, unlike the instant case, those cases did not
involve a "history of detailed consideration by the Congress of the specific
problem presented." 37 Assuming that legislative purpose is frustrated
when a sham transaction results in tax-free consequences, it may be
argued that in the instant case there is no tax-free consequence and the
legislative purpose of section 641 is not frustrated by separate taxation
- whether separate or combined, the income from each trust will none-
theless be taxed under section 641. This argument, however, fails to
consider the fact that a lessening of tax liability through means such as
bracket-splitting equally frustrates the legislative purpose of the section.
32. The House Advisory Group suggested combining trust income where thebeneficiaries were substantially the same. See note 16 supra. This bill met opposition
in the House because it did not distinguish between trusts created for tax reasons
and non-tax reasons. As a result of this disagreement the House finally passed a
substitute bill which merely changed the "throwback" rule from 5 to 10 years. See
H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 113 (1960). The Senate Finance Committee then
reinstated the House Advisory Group Proposal, S. Rip. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960), but this Bill was never brought to a vote during the session because
of the various differences in opinion as to the proper approach to taxing the trusts.
33. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
34. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
35. 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960).
36. In Gregory, the Court held that the formation of a subsidiary for the sole
purpose of spinning-off the parent's assets to accomplish a tax saving was not a
"reorganization" pursuant to section 112(g) of the Revenue Act of 1928. In Knetsch
and Weller, the courts stated that while interest paid on indebtedness is deductible
as an abstract principle, the substance of the transaction negated a showing of actual
"indebtedness" pursuant to section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
37. 51 T.C. No. 4, at 2901.
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The "Clifford" rules38 are a clear example of congressional disapproval
of bracket-splitting when the donor does not make a true disposition of
property through the use of a trust but instead retains control over the
trust property and merely sets up the trust to reduce his personal income
tax liability.8 9
The Tax Court reasoned that if one trust could be taxed separately
pursuant to the Code, then the separate taxation of 20 trusts was merely
a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference. 40 However, as can be
readily ascertained from the facts of the Morris case, a distinction can
validly be made between the creation of many trusts for estate planning
purposes and the creation of many trusts solely to avoid income tax lia-
bility. The usual purpose for creating a trust is to enable the grantor
to make a gift of property and yet still restrict the powers of the bene-
ficiary to manage and dispose of the trust estate. 4 1 While the creation
of one trust as opposed to no trusts admittedly splits income and gen-
erally results in a tax saving, this result arises merely as a consequence
of the grantor's intent to make a gift. Where, however, one trust is
split into many trusts, property disposition is no longer the grantor's in-
tent (assuming that, as in the instant case, all the trusts are substantially
identical) and the allowance of the tax saving under section 641 would
no longer reflect legislative approval of the many legitimate non-tax rea-
sons for creating multiple trusts. Certainly if the grantor had established
only one trust, there could be no logical argument for disallowing separate
taxation of the trust on the basis that the grantor's taxes would be reduced
since the Code's authorization is clear. However, where 20 trusts are
created instead of one, the court should then determine whether the addi-
tional trusts foster the purpose of creating trusts, i.e., property disposi-
tions. Since the creation of the 20 trusts in the present case serves no
valid purpose other than tax avoidance, the formality of the separate
trusts should be pierced and ignored for income tax purposes.42
In refusing to apply a "business purpose" or "economic reality" test,
the Morris court also stated that these tests have never been applied to
the area of trusts because " 'business purpose' is often absent in donative
dispositions of property through the device of the family trust.
'4 3 It
should be noted, however, that the court in the Weller case stated that
"the principle laid down in the Gregory case is not limited to corporate
38. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 671-78.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(b) (1960) states that the principle underlying the
"Clifford" rules is that "income of a trust over which the grantor or another person
has retained substantial dominion or control should be taxed to the grantor or other
person rather than to the trust which receives the income .
40. 51 T.C. No. 4, at 2899.
41. 1 A. ScoTT, LAW ov TRUSTS § 2.3, at 37-8 (3d ed. 1967).
42. See Comment, Taxation of Multiple Trusts, 24 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 156, 166
(1956), where the author suggests a "trust purpose" doctrine to be used as a test to
determine whether there is a non-tax purpose for creating several entities rather
than one.
43. 51 T.C. No. 4, at 2902.
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reorganizations, but rather applies to the federal taxing statutes gen-
erally. '44 Although the Gregory rule has yet to be applied to multiple
trusts, it has found application in the areas of inter-family gifts, 45 , part-
nerships, 46 and corporate distributions and reorganizations.4 7 The Gregory
doctrine has also been applied to multiple corporations where the primary
purpose in setting up multiple corporations, rather than one, is to take
advantage of additional surtax exemptions and accumulated earnings
credits. 48  A still broader statutory incorporation of Gregory is found in
section 269 which disallows corporate deductions, credits, or allowances
resulting from corporate acquisitions made principally for tax avoidance
reasons.
49
While concededly an argument may be made that the "business pur-
pose" test may be more properly associated with transactions entered into
for profit, a similar doctrine, usually called the "consolidation" theory,50
could be used in the donative trust area. Under this theory, courts would
tax together all trust income from trusts created by the same grantor
to the same beneficiary where, as in the instant case, the primary purpose
is tax avoidance rather than property planning.51 The consolidation ap-
44. Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 908 (1960).
45. See, e.g., Gouldman v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1948).
46. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949) ; Kocin v. United
States, 187 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Barrett v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 150 (lst
Cir. 1950).
47. See, e.g., Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938); Shaffer
Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
48. E.g., Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963)
James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).
See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1551 (a) which states:
IN GENERAL. - If -
(2) any corporation transfers, directly or indirectly, after June 12, 1963,
all or part of its property (other than money) to a transferee corporation...
and the transferee corporation was created for the purpose of acquiring such
property or was not actively engaged in business at the time of such acquisition...
the Secretary or his delegate may . . . disallow the surtax exemption . . . or the
$100,000 accumulated earnings credit ....
49. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 269, provides in relevant part:
(a) If-
(2) any corporation acquires ...property of another corporation, not con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by such
acquiring corporation . . .
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoid-
ance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other
allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then the
Secretary or his delegate may disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance.
Treas. Reg. 1.269-2(b) (1962) states that the purpose of this section is to prevent
distortion of the taxpayer's liability through the use of a sham transaction, and
expressly cites Gregory as a judicial recognition of the invalidity of a sham transaction.
50. For an extensive discussion of this theory, see Ervin, Multiple Accumulative
Trusts and Related Problems Under the Income Tax, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 402 (1956) ;
Gordon, Multiple Trusts: The Consolidation Approach, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 25 (1957).
51. Other tests which have been suggested to limit the use of multiple trusts are
an indefinite throwback and a surtax on accumulations similar to the surtax on
corporate earnings. See Gordon, supra note 50. Both of these tests, however, fail to
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proach is a workable substitute for the "business purpose" test in the field
of trusts but has yet to be applied by the courts. The Commissioner relied
on Boyce v. United States52 and Sence v. United States53 in arguing that
a similar approach had been already adopted in multiple trust cases. The
Morris court, however, distinguished Boyce and Sence as holding only
that under "close scrutiny" one trust was created. An analysis of those
cases,54 however, suggests that the "close scrutiny" test served as a fic-
tional basis of decision. The language in Sence is illustrative and suggests
the merit of the Commissioner's position that the court indeed consolidated
income after finding separate, distinct multiple trusts:
Accordingly for income tax purposes, all these substantially iden-
tical trusts created, as part of a family arrangement, primarily for
the benefit of the same beneficiary should be treated as consolidated
into one and the tax computed on the basis of their consolidated in-
comes and with only one exemption.55
Although the court in the instant case squarely faced the issue of the
tax consequences of multiple trusts, it failed to draw an analogy between
the area of trusts and other areas of the Code where a transaction is
judged by its substance rather than its form. The use of the consolidation
theory, it is suggested, would more properly enable courts to recognize
the existence of multiple trusts and then determine their substantive
validity for income tax purposes. In any event, it is hoped that the impact
of the Morris case will stimulate congressional response by way of correc-
tive legislation.
Alan R. Gordon
TORTS - COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
STATUTE NEGATES THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AS AN
ABSOLUTE RULE OF LAW.
Cushman v. Perkins (Maine 1968)
Plaintiff, whose car was blocking a highway exit ramp following an
accident, was injured when the car was struck from behind by the de-
fendant. The trial judge, pursuant to Maine's comparative negligence
distinguish multiple trusts created for tax purposes and those created for non-tax
reasons and thus have failed to receive much support.
52. 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961).
53. 394 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
54. In Sence, for example, the court concluded that 19 multiple trusts were
created solely for tax avoidance and thus taxed them together. Similarly, in Boyce,
the court held that the creation of 90 trusts to the same beneficiary was a mockery
of the tax laws and applied a "close scrutiny" test in order to tax them together.
55. 394 F.2d 842, 852 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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statute1 instructed the jury as to the apportionment of the respective
parties' negligence and as to the law regarding the doctrine of last clear
chance. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff from which the
defendant appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the common law doc-
trine of last clear chance was inapplicable in a jurisdiction which had
enacted a comparative negligence statute. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine reversed and remanded, holding that when the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence was repealed through the action of the Maine legis-
lature, the doctrine of last clear chance as an absolute rule of law was
similarly abolished, but the component elements of the doctrine are still
viable to the extent that the jury should utilize them in their determina-
tion of the apportionment of damages. Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d
846 (Me. 1968).
Under the common law, the jury in negligence actions is compelled
to burden either the plaintiff or the defendant with the entire loss of
plaintiff's injury. In order to exercise some control over this "all or
nothing" approach and to insure rational and consistent decisions, the
courts developed several rules which, based upon the factual findings of
the jury, impose liability upon one of the parties as a matter of law. Two
of these rules are the doctrines of contributory negligence and last clear
chance. The former doctrine has the effect of barring completely an in-
jured plaintiff's recovery where he contributed to his own injury,2 whereas
the latter permits a negligent plaintiff to recover where he could not have
extricated himself from, or was unaware of, his perilous situation and
the defendant, had he been using reasonable care, had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the harm.3 The rules of contributory negligence and
1. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1968) provides:
Where any person suffers death or damage as a result partly of his own fault
and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that
death or damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering
the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to
such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's
share in the responsibility for the damage.
Fault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission
which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section, give rise
to the defense of contributory negligence.
If such claimant is found by the jury to be equally at fault, the claimant shall
not recover.
2. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809); F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.1 (1956).
3. This doctrine was first enunciated in Davies v. Mann, 156 Eng. Rep. 588
(Ex. 1842). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op TORTS §§ 479-80 (1965).
The type of situation which will trigger the application of last clear chance
varies among the jurisdictions. Generally, the situations will be limited to one of
the following:
(1) where plaintiff is helpless and defendant discovers the situation,(2) where defendant could have discovered plaintiff's peril by using rea-
sonable care,
(3) where plaintiff was not helpless but was unaware of the danger which
defendant had discovered, or
(4) where defendant's antecedent negligence has rendered him unable to take
advantage of the last clear chance.
W. PROSSER, LAW oF TORTS § 65 (3d ed. 1964); Prosser, Comparative Negligence,
51 MicH. L. REV. 465, 473 & nn.38-41 (1953).
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last clear chance have been adopted by virtually every American juris-
diction.
At times courts4 and juries5 have expressed dissatisfaction with this
"all or nothing" approach to recovery. Some legislatures have responded
to this discontent by enacting comparative negligence statutes which, in
contrast to the inflexible common law rules, permit the jury to apportion
the damages between the two wrongdoers according to their respective
negligence." While this form of damage apportionment has been widely
adopted in both England7 and Canada,8 it has been slow to gain acceptance
in the United States.9 At present, only seven states, 10 including Maine,
4. E.g., Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 848 (Me. 1968). An instance in which
a judge made a direct plea to the legislature to enact a comparative negligence statute
is found in Connolly v. Steakley, 197 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1967) (concurring opinion),
noted in 20 U. FLA. L. Rgv. 245 (1967).
5. Juries have a tendency to favor the injured plaintiff and in many instances
have reduced plaintiff's recovery rather than return a verdict of contributory negli-
gence. Eldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Outmoded Defense That Should Be
Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52, 53 (1957) ; James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional
Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 716 (1938) ; Prosser, supra note 3, at 469; Comment,
Torts - Comparative Negligence - Evaluation, 1 VILL. L. Rgv. 115, 121 (1956).
6. For a comprehensive history of comparative negligence, see Mole & Wilson,
A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333 (1932) ; Turk, Compara-
tive Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. Rgv. 189, 304 (1950).
7. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28.
See Williams, The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 9 MOD. L. Rrv.
105 (1946).
8. Bowker, Ten More Years Under the Contributory Negligence Acts, 2
U.B.C.L. Rgv. 198 (1965) ; MacIntyre, Last Clear Chance after Thirty Years Under
the Apportionment Statutes, 33 CAN. B. Rgv. 257 (1955).
9. Comparative negligence, as a common law form of apportionment, has been
rejected by most states. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 445; Annot., 114 A.L.R. 830
(1938). Comparative negligence statutes were first enacted in the areas of admiralty
(e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964)) and labor law (e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964), and various state acts enacted to prevent railroad workers from
being denied recovery because of their contributory negligence). For a complete
discussion of these statutes, see MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53
HARV. L. Rxv. 1225 (1940); Mole & Wilson, supra note 6; Pound, Comparative
Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 195 (1954) ; Prosser, supra note 3, at 475-80; Turk,
supra note 6, at 231-38, 305-38.
10. Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1-2 (Supp. 1962) ; Georgia: GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968) ; Maine: ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp.
1968) ; Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942) ; Nebraska: NEB. Rnv. STAT.
§ 25-1151 (1964) ; South Dakota: S.D. COD § 47.0304-1 (Supp. 1960) ; Wisconsin:
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958).
Generally, the applicability of the statute will be limited to one of the following
three situations :
(1) where plaintiff's negligence is slight in comparison to defendant's
(Nebraska and South Dakota),
(2) where plaintiff's negligence must be less than defendant's (Arkansas,
Georgia and Wisconsin), or
(3) where the amount of negligence of either party is irrelevant (Maine
and Mississippi).
For a comparison of these various statutes, see Prosser, supra note 3, at
484-94; Comment, Comparative Negligence: Some New Problems for the Maine
Courts, 18 U. ME. L. Rgv. 65 (1966); Comment, Tort - Comparative Negligence
Statute, 18 VAND. L. REv. 327 (1964).
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have enacted comparative negligence statutes which apply to all types of
negligence cases.
All comparative negligence statutes, either expressly or impliedly,
overrule the defense of contributory negligence." However, one of the
recurring problems faced by courts in jurisdictions which have adopted
this new approach to recovery is whether the companion doctrine of last
clear chance survives the enactment of the comparative negligence statute.
In the absence of a clear legislative mandate,'12 the resolution of this issue
will depend upon the position which the court adopts regarding the pur-
pose of the last clear chance doctrine. If the court takes the position that
the doctrine is a rule judicially developed to mitigate the often unfair
results of contributory negligence, then, since a comparative negligence
statute is specifically designed to remedy this problem, last clear chance
will be rejected. If, on the other hand, the court views the doctrine as
a substantive element in determining the person who is at fault or the
person who caused the accident, then the doctrine will still be applied.
The Cushman decision is significant because, in contrast to the majority
of courts, it adopts the former rationale and rejects the doctrine of last
clear chance as an absolute rule of law.' 8
11. The Maine statute expressly eliminates contributory negligence as a defense
and predicates the application of the statute on the ability of the defense to be raised
were it not for the statute. MZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1968).
12. One of the few legislatures which has spoken on the issue of last clear chance
is found in the report of the Law Review Committee which proposed the apportion-
ment law in England. It concluded that last clear chance would not be affected
by the statute since it was a rule of causation. Williams, supra note 7, at 126. But see
note 26 infra.
13. Of the seven American jurisdictions which have comparative negligence
statutes, only Maine and Wisconsin completely abolished last clear chance. However,
two of the states have modified its application. The following is a short summary
of the status of the doctrine in the various states.
Arkansas: Although there have been no cases which have decided the issue,
it would appear from a reading of the statute in light of preceding statutes that last
clear chance is still a viable doctrine. Under the first comparative negligence statute
enacted in Arkansas, No. 191, [1955] Ark. Acts 443 (repealed 1957), contributory
negligence was expressly eliminated as a defense in all negligence cases and the
statute specifically prohibited the application of the doctrine of last clear chance.
Garner, Comparative Negligence and Discovered Peril, 10 ARK. L. Rgv. 72 (1955-56).
However, the comparative negligence statutes which superseded the 1955 Act differed
in two major respects: (1) the statute was applicable only when plaintiff's negligence
was of a lesser degree than defendant's and (2) no mention was made of the doctrine
of last clear chance. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1-2 (1962) ; No. 296, [1957] Ark.
Acts 874 (repealed 1961). Such an obvious omission would seem to indicate that last
clear chance would still be applied.
Georgia: The doctrine of last clear chance has consistently been held to be
compatible with Georgia's comparative negligence statute. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R.,
72 Ga. App. 692, 697-98, 34 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1945) ; accord, Mixon v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 380 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1967); Grayson v. Yarbrough, 103 Ga. App. 243,
119 S.E.2d 41 (1961) ; Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 91 Ga. App. 277, 85
S.E.2d 542 (1954). Although Blackwell was reversed on other grounds by the
Georgia supreme court, Justice Mobley, in a dissenting opinion, reiterated the validity
of last clear chance. Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 670, 88S.E.2d 6, 10 (1955). Contra, Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d
90 (1948) (the right to, as well as the amount of recovery, are questions of fact
to be decided by the jury). For a general discussion, see Comment, Doctrine of Last
Clear Chance in Georgia, 13 GA. B.J. 104 (1950).
Mississippi: The doctrine of last clear chance is available but has limited
application. Defendant must actually have discovered plaintiff's peril and then have
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The adherence to the fault and causation rationales of last clear
chance by the majority of courts is a product of the doctrine's 'historical
development. The rule was enunciated when the concept of negligence,
which predicated liability on fault, was emerging. Although there was
some language in the early cases which intimated that last clear chance
was an expression of this fault concept, 14 the courts primarily couched
their discussion of the doctrine in terms of proximate causation. 15 These
courts reasoned that since the defendant was the last wrongdoer, his act
broke the causative chain of events set off by plaintiff's negligence and
became a supervening cause directly leading to the final injury.'6 Plain-
tiff's negligent act was considered a remote cause of the injury, one
which only created the condition under which the defendant committed
his negligent act.' 7 This view has been widely adopted in the United
StateS' 8 where last clear chance is considered "no more than a logically
necessary deduction from the principles of proximate cause."' 9
failed to act as a reasonable man. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Burney, 248
Miss. 290, 159 So. 2d 85, 91-92 (1963). Significantly, Mississippi courts have in-
frequently utilized the doctrine after the state's comparative negligence statute was
enacted in 1910. This led the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to conclude that
"[t]he doctrine of discovered peril or last clear chance . . . loses most of its meaning
and importance in Mississippi. This explains why most of the cases applying the
doctrine are old cases." Illinois Central R.R. v. Underwood, 235 F.2d 868, 874 n.13(5th Cir. 1956). For a general discussion, see Price, Applicability of Last Clear
Chance Doctrine in Mississippi, 29 Miss. L.J. 248 (1958).
Nebraska: Last clear chance still exists but in a modified form. See note 23
infra.
South Dakota: It has been held that last clear chance is compatible with the
comparative negligence statute where it was certainly the last clear chance. Where
plaintiff's negligent act creating the peril occurs almost simultaneously with the
happening of the accident, the application of the doctrine is inappropriate. Vlach v.
Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817 (1960), noted in 6 S.D.L. Rev. 96 (1961);
accord, Rumbolz v. Wipf, -. -- S.D ......- , 145 N.W.2d 520 (1966).
Wisconsin: Last clear chance was abolished prior to the enactment of the
comparative negligence statute. Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co., 188 Wis. 330, 206 N.W.
407 (1925).
For a general discussion of the viability of last clear chance following the
enactment of these statutes, see Comment, The Validity of Retaining the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine in a State Having a Comparative Negligence Statute, 1 GA. STr. B.J.
500 (1965).
14. A good discussion of the fault rationale of last clear chance is found in Bohlen,
Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. Rgv. 233 (1908); MacIntyre, supra note 9;
Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. PA. L. Rev. 572, 589,
604-05 (1951).
15. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 23-26(1927) ; James, supra note 5; Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 48-54, 51-54 n.8 (1934).
16. James, supra note 5, at 707; Williams, supra note 7, at 113.
17. Maclntyre, supra note 9, at 1234 & n.16. Professor MacIntyre states the
various modes of expression used by the courts to describe this rationale of causation.
18. American cases adopting this rationale have been extensively collected and
discussed. Prosser, supra note 3; Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1958) ; Comment, The
Validity of Retaining the Last Clear Chance Doctrine in a State Having a Compara-
tive Negligence Statute, 1 GA. ST. B.J. 500 (1965) ; Comment, Comparative Negli-
gence: Some New Problems for the Maine Courts, 18 U. ME. L. Rlv. 65 (1966).
19. James, supra note 5, at 707.
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In those jurisdictions which have enacted comparative negligence
statutes, the use of the causation rationale has resulted in a retention of
the doctrine of last clear chance. 20  These courts reason that since the
defendant's last clear chance released the plaintiff from all liability
stemming from his own negligence, the plaintiff has not contributed to
his own injury. Since under this analysis there is only one negligent
party, the court never reaches the question of apportionment of damages
between two wrongdoers under the comparative negligence statute.
While this position would at first blush appear logically valid, it is
unsound because it fails to differentiate between the actual cause of the
harm - causation in fact - and the proximate cause. The actual part of
the harm is the event or events which were factors in bringing about the
harm - a "but for" test of causation.2 ' This is the only type of causation
which is significant under a comparative negligence statute since it is
essential to determine only that both parties actually, but not necessarily
proximately, caused the harm in order for apportionment of damages to
be appropriate. On the other hand, the proximate cause of the harm in-
volves the very different question of who should be held accountable for
the accident, a question which involves, in addition to the issue of actual
causation, policy issues of allocating moral and social responsibility. 22
Since a comparative negligence statute represents a basic change in policy
concerning the allocation of liability, though not affecting the determina-
tion of the actual causes of an injury, a corresponding change in what is
considered the proximate cause should result. This change has not been
made by those courts which consider the last human wrongdoer as the
sole proximate cause of the harm even though the comparative negligence
statute clearly permits apportionment of damages between the two wrong-
ful parties. 23
20. See note 13 supra.
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 240-45.
22. It is sometimes said to be a question of whether the conduct has been so
significant and important a cause that the defendant should be legally responsible.
But both significance and importance turn upon conclusions in terms of legal
policy . . . . This is not a question of causation, or even a question of fact, but
is quite far removed from both ....
Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
23. The Nebraska supreme court has attempted to redefine the doctrine of last
clear chance in light of the policies implicit in Nebraska's comparative negligence
statute by limiting the application of the doctrine to situations where (1) the de-
fendant's last clear chance was the actual cause of the injury, (2) the plaintiff's
precedent negligence was not an active or a contributing factor to the accident, and (3)
it neither induced nor invited defendant's negligent act. Whitehouse v. Thompson,
150 Neb. 370, 34 N.W.2d 385 (1948); see Bezdek v. Patrick, 170 Neb. 522, 103
N.W.2d 318 (1960); Malcolm v. Dox, 168 Neb. 539, 100 N.W.2d 538 (1960); Donald
v. Heller, 143 Neb. 600, 10 N.W.2d 447 (1943). On the other hand, where theplaintiff's negligence was continuous and active up to the moment of the accident andin fact contributed to the injury, then the apportionment of damages becomes proper
and the fact that defendant had the last clear chance becomes an element to be weighed
by the jury in determining the damages. Benedict v. Andersen, 162 Neb. 735, 77N.W.2d 320 (1956) ; Portis v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 158 Neb. 28, 62 N.W.2d
323 (1954) ; Bush v. James, 152 Neb. 189, 40 N.W.2d 667 (1950) ; Trumbley v.Moore, 151 Neb. 780, 39 N.W.2d 613 (1949) ; Folken v. Petersen, 140 Neb. 800,
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The problem is not that the courts have failed to recognize that there
can be more than one wrongdoer. There was never any doubt that a
negligent plaintiff, even though not the last wrongdoer, could still be one
of the actual causes of his injury.24 The real crux of the problem is
that many courts, adhering to precedent, continue to regard the defendant's
last clear chance in terms of the old common law concept of proximate
cause under the guise of ascertaining the "actual" wrongdoer. In such a
situation, the court is then led to disregard, as a matter of law, the essen-
tial issue under a comparative negligence statute - that even though
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the harm and was the
last human wrongdoer, the plaintiff was in fact one of the actual causes
of the injury.25 If analyzed in this light, apportionment of damages is
clearly applicable in this situation.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine acknowledged this change of
basic policy under the comparative negligence statute and responded by
rejecting the doctrine of last clear chance because it supports the concept
of the sole wrongdoer which is diametrically opposed to the very premise
of comparative negligence .2  The Cushman court reasoned that since a
1 N.W.2d 916 (1942). See also Roby v. Auker, 149 Neb. 734, 32 N.W.2d 491 (1948)
(last clear chance is still applicable if merely the consequences or peril resulting from
the plaintiff's prior but completed negligent conduct continues up to the time of the
accident). For a general discussion, see Johnson, Comparative Negligence - The
Nebraska View, 36 NEB. L. REv. 240, 247-55 (1957).
24. For example, in O'Brien v. McGlinchy, 68 Me. 522 (1878), which established
the doctrine of last clear chance in Maine, the parents of a child permitted him to
walk in the street where he was struck by a horse-drawn wagon. The O'Brien court
clearly indicated that both the actions of the parents and the driver of the wagon
were, in fact, the two actual causes of the accident but that a choice, predicated on
certain policies, had to be made as to who would bear the total liability, i.e., whose
actions would be designated the sole proximate cause of the harm.
25. Professor Prosser has demonstrated the logical inconsistency inherent in this
line of reasoning by applying the general rule to a situation involving three parties. As
between the two wrongdoers, only one would be declared the sole proximate cause of
the injury and would be fully liable. On the other hand, in a suit instituted by the
injured third party, both wrongful parties would be held liable for contribution.
Although not adopted by any jurisdiction, Prosser suggests that the inconsistency
could be resolved by denying the plaintiff who was an active cause of the accident
the benefits of a full recovery to the extent that the injured third party could recover
from him. Prosser, supra note 3, at 468.
26. Several legal commentators have acknowledged this change. James, supra
note 5; Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Gzo. L.J. 674, 702-05 (1934);
MacIntyre, supra note 9; Prosser, supra note 3; Comment, Comparative Negligence:
Some New Problems for the Maine Courts, 18 U. Mn. L. Rev. 65 (1966).
Florida took the same position in Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1956),
where the court abolished last clear chance in cases applying Florida's comparative
negligence statute, which is limited to negligence suits against railroads. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.06 (1964). Citing no precedent, the court relied solely on the persuasive
arguments of many of the authors referred to in this Note.
It would appear that the courts of England have also recognized this change
in basic policy. In Davies v. Swan Motor Co., [1949] 2 K.B. 291, Lord Denning,
recognizing that the doctrine of last clear chance had lost most of its vitality as a
rule of law prior to the enactment of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)
Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28, suggested that it should be eliminated from English
law as a practical test of causation in light of the statute. This was contrary to the
opinion of the Law Review Committee, see note 12 supra, and Lord Justices Evershed
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Maine jury is not faced with making an "all or nothing" decision as to
whether plaintiff may recover, there was no longer any need to place a
judicial limitation on the jury for his protection. Therefore, there was
no "reason or justification" for retaining the doctrine of last clear chance.
Although the court found that the doctrine of last clear chance lost
all vitality as an absolute rule of law, the component elements of the
doctrine, such as "the degree of plaintiff's negligence, its remoteness in
time, the efficiency of its causation, the degree of defendant's negligence,
the efficiency of its causation, defendant's awareness of plaintiff's peril,
defendant's opportunity to avoid doing damage and his failure to do so
- [remained] as factors to be considered by the jury in measuring and
comparing the parties' relative fault."27 The court has, in effect, trans-
formed the doctrine of last clear chance from an absolute rule of law and
limitation on liability into an issue of fact for the jury to consider in
apportioning the damages.
The Cushman rationale appears valid both in terms of legal reason-
ing and in the implementation of legislative intent. By freeing the lower
courts and juries from the limitation of last clear chance, the court has
applied the statute in a manner which best effectuates the underlying
change in policy. It is the legislative intent that the jury apportion the
damages between two negligent parties on the basis of the facts of each
case, not on the basis of judicially created legal formulae which were
designed not to apportion damages but rather to place liability on one
party.28 The net result of this decision therefore is not to alter the old
rules of causation but rather to put the effects of these rules into the
hands of the jury. Although many courts are tied by precedent to the
causation approach to last clear chance, as more states enact comparative
negligence statutes, the courts should adopt the Cushman approach and
consider the problem in light of the underlying policy of comparative
negligence.
Andrew Silverman
and Bucknill who held that the statute had no effect on the doctrine. In Harvey v.
Road Haulage Executive, [1952] 1 K.B. 120, Lord Denning again pronounced the
doctrine obsolete and in recent cases no mention of the doctrine has been made even
though the factual situation appeared to justify its application. This would seem to
indicate that the doctrine is no longer viable. E.g., Miraflores v. Livanos, [1967]
1 A.C. 826, 848-49.
It is interesting to note that in civil law jurisdictions, where a comparative
negligence rule is applied, neither the doctrine of contributory negligence nor last
clear chance has developed. MacIntyre, supra note 9, at 1236-41; Mole & Wilson,
supra note 6, at 337-38; Turk, supra note 6, at 207.
27. 245 A.2d at 850-51 (emphasis added).
28. The legislative history indicates that the Maine legislators reached the con-
clusion that since there could be two wrongdoers, it was unfair, arbitrary, and un-
realistic to burden one of the parties with the entire loss. MAINS, LEGISLATVZ
RECORD, vol. 2, 2409-16 (1965).
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TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LANDOWNERS' LIABILITY - COMMON LAW
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN LICENSEE, INVITEE, AND TRESPASSER ARE
ABOLISHED IN CALIFORNIA AND REPLACED BY A STANDARD OF ORDI-
NARY CARE.
Rowland v. Christian (Cal. 1968)
Plaintiff, a social guest in defendant's apartment, was injured as a
result of a defective water faucet and brought an action for personal
injuries in the Superior Court of San Francisco, alleging that defendant
knew of the defect in the faucet and that plaintiff was going to use it, yet
failed to warn him of its dangerous condition. Defendant moved for
summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff, as a social guest, was owed
no duty by defendant except to refrain from wilful or wanton injury.
The trial court granted defendant's motion, holding that the affidavits
showed that plaintiff was a licensee who, with respect to defective con-
ditions, was bound to take the premises as he found them. On the same
basis, the court of appeals affirmed.1 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
California reversed and, although it could have reached the same result
within traditional rules, held that the common law distinctions between
invitee, licensee, and trespasser are abolished in California, and that the
proper test to be applied in determining a landowner's liability is in accord-
ance with section 1714 of the California Civil Code.2 Under this statute,
the new test of liability is whether one in the management of his property
has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others
and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may,
under the circumstances, have some bearing on the question of liability,
such status is no longer determinative. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d
89, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
In light of the high regard placed on private property rights by
early English and American thought,3 the common law courts developed
rules designed to limit a landowner's liability for negligence. 4 Entrants
onto land were segregated into three distinct categories, with a dif-
ferent duty of care owed by the occupier to each entrant depending
on his status.5 Generally, a landowner owed no duty to a trespasser6 or
1. Rowland v. Christian, 255 Cal. App. 2d 516, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1967).
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 1954) provides: "Every one is responsible, not
only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except
so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury
upon himself."
3. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1432 (1956).
4. Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1856). See also F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 3.
5. F. HARPER, LAW op TORTS §§ 88-89 (1953) ; Marsh, The History and Com-
parative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182 (1953).
6. Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry., 76 F. 201 (7th Cir. 1896) ; McPheters v.
Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 A.2d 437 (1939) ; Augusta Ry. v. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653, 16
S.E. 203 (1892) ; Palmer v. Gordon, 173 Mass. 410, 53 N.E. 909 (1899) ; Magar v.
Hammond, 183 N.Y. 387, 76 N.E. 474 (1906) ; Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers,
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licensee 7 except to refrain from wilful injury, and owed to the invitee s
a duty to inspect the premises to make them safe.
Recently, however, in response to changing social mores, the courts
have created exceptions to these restricted rules. A landowner is now
bound to exercise due care to a child trespasser if the child has entered
the land due to an "attractive nuisance,"10 or an "artificial condition,""1 or
if the child is considered "foreseeable.' 2 The duty is extended to an adult
trespasser if he is a "frequent trespasser on a limited area" 3 or a "dis-
covered trespasser.' u 4 With respect to a licensee, the landowner owes a
duty when he is carrying on "active operations"' 5 or when he knows of
a "concealed danger"' 6 on the premises and fails to warn of its presence.
Although the duty owed an invitee has not changed, 17 the number of
12 TtMP. L.Q. 32 (1937) ; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed
to Trespassers, 63 YALt L.J. 144 (1953) ; Note, Landowners' Liability in New Jersey:
The Limitation of Traditional Immunities, 12 RUTG4Rs L. Riv. 599 (1947).
7. Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1952); Rosenberger v.
Consolidated Coal Co., 318 Ill. App. 8, 47 N.E.2d 491 (1943) ; Steinmeyer v. McPher-
son, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236 (1951) ; Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 169 S.W.2d 4(1943) ; Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises
of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. Rtv. 142, 237, 340 (1921) ; James, Tort Liability
of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YAL L.J. 605
(1954); Marsh, supra note 5, at 359; Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26
MINN. L. Rgv. 573 (1942).
8. Traditionally, the invitee has been defined as one who enters the premises
for the economic benefit of the landower. E.g., Brown v. Davenport Holding Co., 134
Neb. 455, 279 N.W. 161 (1938) ; Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1(1959). Presently, however, the definition has been expanded in some jurisdictions by
the "invitation test." Under this test, one who is invited onto the premises with
assurance that the land has been made safe for his reception is given the status of
an invitee. Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942) ; Sulhoff v.
Everett, 235 Iowa 396, 16 N.W.2d 737 (1944) ; McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash. 2d 640, 414 P.2d 773 (1966), noted in 42 WASH. L. Riv.
299 (1966).
9. Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), aft'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867),
which has been accepted in all common law jurisdictions. W. PROSSER, THt LAW
ov TORTS 395 (3d ed. 1964). See also RISTAT4MPNT Op TORTS § 332 (1938) ; James,
supra note 7; Prosser, supra note 7.
10. McGill v. United States, 200 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Strang v. South Jersey
Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 86 A.2d 777 (1952) ; Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa.
585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942).
11. R STATEMgNT (Stcoun) ov TORTS § 339 (1965).
12. Hocking v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 263 Minn. 483, 117 N.W.2d
304 (1962) ; Meagher v. Hirt, 232 Minn. 336, 45 N.W.2d 563 (1951); Nichols v.
Consolidated Dairies, 125 Mont. 460, 239 P.2d 740 (1952). See also Eldredge, supra
note 6; Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARV. L. R~v.
826 (1923).
13. Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. v. Spoonamore's Adm'r, 278 Ky. 673, 129 S.W.2d 175 (1939) ; Cheslock v.
Pittsburgh Rys., 363 Pa. 157, 69 A.2d 108 (1949). Contra, Jackson v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 176 Md. 1, 3 A.2d 719 (1939).
14. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Clint, 235 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1956)
Averch v. Johnston, 90 Colo. App. 321, 9 P.2d 291 (1932) ; McVicar v. W.R. Arthur
& Co., 312 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1958).
15. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Blevins, 293 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956)
While v. Burkeybile, 386 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) ; Anderson v. Welty, 334
S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1960); Slobodzian v. Beighley, 401 Pa. 520, 164 A.2d 923 (1960).
This position is also adopted by RESTATEMENT (StcoND) or TORTS § 341 (1965).
16. Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965) ; Yazzolino
v. Jones, 153 Cal. App. 2d 626, 315 P.2d 107 (1957); Newman v. Fox West Coast
Theatres, 86 Cal. App. 2d 428, 194 P.2d 706 (1948).
17. Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), af'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867).
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entrants included within that status has grown in jurisdictions which have
adopted the liberal "invitation test."18
The instant decision is the first case to abolish completely the common
law distinctions, characterizing them as "unrealistic, arbitrary, and in-
elastic," 19 and to announce in their place a standard of the "reasonable
property owner." By its decision, the court attempts to eliminate the
confusion and inconsistency which have plagued the courts for many years
as a result of having to ascertain the status of the entrant and to distinguish
different duties owed. This two-step process has led to curious results.
For example, a man who purchased a drink in a tavern and was injured
by a fall into a concealed trap was allowed recovery since, as an invitee,
he was owed a duty of reasonable care ;20 however, on similar facts, another
who was treated to a drink by an associate was denied recovery because,
having personally conferred no pecuniary benefit on the owner, he was
characterized as a licensee.21
The court also recognized inconsistency in the theory used by most
courts to classify one as an invitee or licensee. The general theory is that
if a landowner receives economic benefit as a result of the entrant's pres-
ence, he should assume a greater burden,22 and, conversely, if one enters
the owner's premises for his own benefit, it is said that he receives the use
of the premises as a gift and consequently has no right to demand that
they be made safe for his reception.23 This benefit-duty theory has often
been overlooked where the plaintiff entered the premises in performance of
a public duty. For example, firemen, on burning premises clearly for the
benefit of the landowner and not for their own benefit, have usually been
classified as licensees2 4 and as such have been denied recovery when injured
as a result of an unsafe condition.25 The Rowland court, by designating
the "reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others" as the
test of duty, has also solved the anomaly of not imposing duty when benefit
is conferred. Although in similar circumstances liability may be denied
under the rule of the instant case, the basis of decision will not be that
firemen are licensees, but rather that the landowner has not acted unrea-
sonably under the circumstances.
Another problem resolved by the instant decision is that of ascertaining
the injured party's status at the time of injury, since in some cases an act
by either the entrant or the occupier may cause the entrant's original status
18. See note 8 supra.
19. 69 Cal. 2d at 98, 443 P. 2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
20. Braun v. Vallade, 33 Cal. App. 279, 164 P. 904 (1917).
21. Kneuser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205, 133 P. 989 (1913).
22. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 395. The economic benefit test has been expanded
by the "invitation test." See note 8 supra.
23. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 385.
24. Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959) ; Krauth v. Geller,
54 N.J. Super. 442, 149 A.2d 271 (1959).
25. It should be noted, however, that some recent cases have recognized that
firemen may be classified as invitees. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881
(1960) ; see Cameron v. Abatiell, __ Vt .. 241 A.2d 310 (1968).
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to change. The problem is well illustrated by an English case 26 where a
canvasser who originally came upon the premises without the owner's
consent was classified as a trespasser; once given permission his status
changed to a licensee; and when he transacted business with the occupier
he was ultimately an invitee. Even when a canvasser does business with
the occupier, the instant case recognizes no sound justification for dis-
tinguishing the occupier's duty to him upon arrival and upon departure.
Under the more flexible reasonable care standard, liability would turn not
on the characterization of the status of the entrant at time of injury, but
on whether a reasonable man would have foreseen his injury and used
reasonable care to prevent it.
In considering what should be the correct test of liability, the court
analyzed the historical justifications for limiting the extent of a landowner's
liability and recognized that not only was confusion inherent in the cor-
rect application of the common law rules, but also that results based
on property rights are not compatible with an expanding regard for the
integrity of the person. The Rowland court concluded, therefore, that as
a matter of policy the factors which should today determine liability
are "the closeness of connection between the injury and the defendant's con-
duct, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of pre-
venting future harm, and the prevalence and availability of insurance .... ,27
In support of its decision, the court noted the analogous area of
admiralty law where the Supreme Court, in Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique,28 held that the distinctions between invitee and
licensee are inapplicable to the law of admiralty. 29 In Kermarec, the Court
observed that the common law distinctions originated in a legal system
in which an individual's social status depended upon his estate in real
property and that such a legal system was alien to the sea, and "[flor
the admiralty law . . . to import such conceptual distinctions would be
foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality." 30
As further support, the Rowland court broadly observed that the
common law distinctions have been repudiated by statute in England, the
jurisdiction of their birth.31 The court, however, has gone beyond the
English Occupiers' Liability Act 32 since that Act merely abrogated the
distinction between invitee and licensee and was silent with respect to the
status of trespasser. It should also be noted that much of the encourage-
ment for passage of a statutory standard of negligence in England was
due to the decline of jury trials in the English courts.38  Moreover, an
26. Dunster v. Abbot, [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572 (C.A.).
27. 69 Cal. 2d at 99, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
28. 358 U.S. 625 (1958).
29. Id. at 631.
30. Id.
31. 69 Cal. 2d at 100, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
32. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
33. A committee was appointed to study the problem and report to the legislature.
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examination of the few English cases decided under the statute reveals
that: (1) "control," by the occupier of the hazard causing injury is now
necessary for the imposition of liability ;34 (2) a mere "warning" is suffi-
cient to discharge the landowner's duty of reasonable care;85 and (3) the
entrant's contributory negligence is becoming less of a factor in cases where
the occupier has failed to exercise his statutory duty of due care.36 For
these reasons, inter alia, the English statute has received criticism almost
from its enactment.37
The law of bailments is another analogous area of negligence law
where some courts"8 have abolished common law distinctions. At common
law, the duty owed by a bailee to bailor was determined by whether the
bailment was considered "gratuitous,"3 9 "mutual" 40 or for the "sole benefit"
of the bailor.41 The duty of care owed by a bailee was determined by a
sliding scale with the greatest duty owed when the relationship created
was for the sole benefit of the bailee. The theory of bailments, therefore, is
analogous to that underlying the common law rules of landowners' liability,
in that, as does the bailee, the landowner owes his greatest duty of care
when he receives pecuniary or other benefit from the relationship. In
abolishing the common law bailment distinctions, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, in the landmark case of Peet v. Roth Hotel,42 reasoned that
the degree of care to be exercised by a bailee should be commensurate with
the risk involved and until a more satisfactory criterion can be formulated,
that of "ordinary care should be followed in every case . . . .-43 Cases
subsequent to the Minnesota decision indicate that the abolition of the
common law degrees of care has resulted in no increase in bailees' liability,
and that the determining factor under the reasonable care test is not whether
the bailee benefited, but whether he exercised due care in relation to the
foreseeability of damage.44 Under the instant decision, economic benefit
will also no longer be a determining factor.
34. See Wheat v. Lacon & Co., [1966] 1 All E.R. 582 (H.L.) ; Kearney v. Eric
Waller, Ltd., [1965] 3 All E.R. 352 (Q.B.).
35. See Roles v. Nathan, [1963] 2 All E.R. 908 (C.A.).
36. See Braithwaite v. South Durham Steel Co., [1958] 3 All E.R. 161(York Ass.).
37. Odgers, Occupiers' Liability: A Further Comment, 1957 CAMB. L.J. 39;
Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MOD. L. REv. 359 (1958).
38. Kubli v. First Nat'l Bank, 191 Iowa 194, 200 N.W. 434 (1924) ; Peet v. Roth
Hotel Co., 191 Minn. 151, 253 N.W. 546 (1934) ; Gabark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188,
51 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
39. This is a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee. Peters v. Thompson, 42
So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1949) ; Industrial Lumber Co. v. Strickland, 71 Ga. App. 298, 30
S.E.2d 792 (1944) ; Lowney v. Knott, 83 R.I. 505, 120 A.2d 552 (1956).
40. Home Ins. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 86 Ohio App. 91, 97 N.E.2d
231 (1949) ; Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 216 Ore. 567, 340 P.2d 181 (1959).
41. Hargis v. Spencer, 254 Ky. 297, 71 S.W.2d 666 (1934) ; Curlee Clothing
Co. v. Robinson, 130 Okla. 41, 265 P. 108 (1928).
42. 191 Minn. 151, 253 N.W. 546 (1934).
43. Id. at 153, 253 N.W. at 548.
44. Wallinga v. Johnson, 269 Minn. 436, 131 N.W.2d 216 (1964) ; Zanker v.
Cedar Flying Serv., Inc., 214 Minn. 242, 7 N.W.2d 775 (1943) ; Dennis v. Coleman's
Parking & Greasing Stations, Inc., 211 Minn. 597, 2 N.W.2d 233 (1942).
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Although the court's aim in the instant case in attempting to eliminate
the confusion that has been produced by the common law distinctions is
commendable, Justice Burke notes in dissent 45 that the former rules have
served as a workable approach to the problem of deciding a landowner's
liability and provided a stability highly prized in the law. Implicit in Justice
Burke's position is that the aim of a legal system is certainty and control;
however, such an argument fails to recognize that the price often paid for
certainty is the arbitrary operition of the common law rules in border-
line cases. One commentator, 46 in surveying the history of the common
law distinctions, has offered rebuttal to Justice Burke's stability argument
by noting that by determining liability solely by the extension of legal
doctrine "[i]t [is] easy to fall into one of the common fallacies of legal
reasoning, namely, that if liability cannot be established by a certain legal
principle it cannot be established at all."'47 From this it may be inferred
that an ultimate determination of liability based on general principles of
negligence will eliminate the mechanical jurisprudence that has forced
courts to reach results within a strained construction of traditional rules.
In accordance with this conclusion, the court points out that other jurisdic-
tions, by further stretching the common law rules, have reached the same
result as the instant case,48 but explains that to accept such an approach
would only add to the existing confusion.
The dissent also argues that the failure of the majority to indicate
what effect status will have on deciding liability in future cases "appears
to open the door to potentially unlimited liability . . . . 49 However, it is
implicit in the majority's caveat that status will have some effect on
liability that the relationship of the parties may still be important for
determining reasonable care under the circumstances. Whether the im-
portance of the relationship between the landowner and one entering his
premises should be reflected in different legal categories with varying
degrees of duty, or should merely be taken into account among other
factors in applying a broader standard of reasonable care, seems to be
primarily a question of social policy. Under this rationale, the Rowland
case may result in a change in degree of duty owed as well as in the method
of determining liability.
Although the court cites the lead of England and admiralty in support
of abolishing the common law classifications, neither the English statute °
nor the Kermarec5' decision included the trespasser within a class to
whom a duty of reasonable care was owed. It is this further step by the
Rowland court which may be subject to some question. The reasons given
45. 69 Cal. 2d at 102, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
46. Marsh, supra note 5.
47. Id. at 186.
48. 69 Cal. 2d at 101, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
49. Id. at 102, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
50. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
51. 358 U.S. 625 (1958).
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at common law for holding that a landowner owed no duty to a trespasser
was that in a civilization based on private land ownership, it is socially
desirable to allow a man to use his land as he sees fit without imposing
upon him the burden of anticipating unexpected entries onto his land by
uninvited visitors. 52 It was also said that since a trespasser entered with-
out permission he was a wrongdoer and as such should not profit from his
own wrongdoing. 53 Based on these considerations, a landowner was not
obliged to take special precautions and consequently a trespasser assumed
the risks that he might encounter.5 4 Exceptions to this rule have developed,
however, due to a belief that regard for safety is of more social importance
than a landowner's free and unrestricted use of his land.5 5 Each exception
is premised on foreseeability56 on the theory that if a landowner can fore-
see harm, it is not an undue burden to impose on him the duty to exercise
reasonable care. It appears that the existing exceptions to a landowner's
immunity from liability to trespassers are sufficient in that the traditional
rights of the property owner are balanced against the foreseeability of
harm to the person. In the instant case the court not only sees an increased
regard for human safety, but makes personal rights the dominant con-
sideration in the determination of liability. This judgment is expressed
in the majority's statement that "[a] man's life or limb does not become
less worthy of protection ... because he has come upon the land of another
without permission . . . -57 Some difficulty remains, however, when the
emphasis is focused on the landowner rather than on the entrant, for, as
the dissent asks, "[w] ho can doubt that the . . . department store . . . owes
a greater duty of care to one whom it has invited to enter its premises as
a prospective customer . . . than it owes to a trespasser seeking to enter
after the close of business hours . ",8
Although in many situations application of the tests of the instant case
will reach the same results as under the common law status rules, the
dissent has, as previously noted, expressed a fear of opening the door to
unlimited liability. The majority's position, however, leaves future courts
greater latitude to allow juries to decide cases by applying a reasonable-
ness standard, while judges may still exercise their traditional jury controls
of summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict to effectively contain the jury within proper confines. Also,
in the cases where there may be increased liability, the majority has
justified the result by pointing to the prevalance of homeowner's insurance.
52. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 365-68.
53. Id. at 366.
54. Eldredge, supra note 6; Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Land-
owner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MICH. L. Rxv. 495 (1923) ; James, supra
note 6.
55. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 368. See p. 361 supra for the exceptions.
56. Hocking v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 263 Minn. 483, 117 N.W.2d
304 (1962) ; Meagher v. Hirt, 232 Minn. 336, 45 N.W.2d 563 (1951) ; Nichols v.
Consolidated Dairies, 125 Mont. 460, 239 P.2d 740 (1952).
57. 69 Cal. 2d at 100, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
58. Id. at 101, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
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As one practical result of the instant case, it appears that some cases
which were previously dismissed on summary judgment motions will now
go to the jury, and it seems likely, therefore, that there will be an increase
in liability.59 Furthermore, there will in all likelihood be an increase in
personal injury litigation.
Since status will still have some effect on the reasonableness of the
landowner's acts, California courts will still be forced to make some deter-
mination of status. It is therefore possible to foresee that an entirely new
body of case law will develop with as many refinements and narrow dis-
tinctions as the old rules. Not surprisingly, it was this possibility that
caused one member of England's Law Reform Committee to dissent from
recommending the adoption of statutory negligence as the English standard
in landowner liability cases.60
In final analysis, the Rowland court has effected an exemplary change
in the law by abolishing the common law distinctions and has provided the
flexibility so vitally needed in this area. The statutory definition of negli-
gence adopted has decreased the legal importance of determining an en-
trant's initial status and his status at time of injury and of ascertaining
the duty owed to persons of that status. The California courts will also be
relieved from the task of finding qualifications and exceptions to the old
rules - a burden which has plagued courts for many years. The common
law system of classification has produced little more than confusion, con-
flict, and exceptions to the rules. It is submitted that deciding these cases
on a broad basis of negligence will eliminate the necessity of making some-
times tenuous distinctions to permit an injured plaintiff to be a member of
a class to whom a duty was owed. It may be argued, however, that the
court is setting too rapid a pace by eliminating the common law rules and
exceptions developed with respect to trespassers because the common law
rules based on foreseeability have been adequate."'
Robert M. Britton
59. As early as 1857, it was said in a negligence case that "a case of this sort...
could only be submitted to a jury with one result." Toomey v. London & Brighton
Ry., 140 Eng. Rep. 696 (C.B. 1857).
60. LAW RrEORM COMM., THIRD REPORT, CMD No. 9305, at 43-44 (1954).
61. Nevertheless, in the rare situations where the foreseeability of injury to a
trespasser is greater than the foreseeability of injury to an invitee, the reasonableness
test will provide the flexibility needed to impose liability. For example, if there is a
wooden bridge on the landowner's property which, unknown to the landowner, is
sufficiently deteriorated so as to be unable to support a frequent trespass by auto,
there may be greater foreseeability of harm to the known trespasser, who travels over
the bridge by car, than there is to the invitee, who travels over the bridge by foot.
Under the traditional rules, the landowner's duty would be to warn of defects which
are known, whereas under the reasonable man test, the court may hold that reason-
ableness requires the landowner to inspect. Another example is where the landowner
keeps a defective electric wire on his premises. It may be said that the foresecability
of harm would be greater to a discovered trespasser who is unaware of the defect,
than it would be to an electrician, an invitee, who would readily recognize the defect
and need no warning of the danger.
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